Honolulu fire fighters close call with a communication room explosion On August 12, 2009, at 2217 hours, Honolulu Fire Department (HFD) units responded to an “odor of gas” in downtown Honolulu. Fire officials on scene contacted the local gas company requesting their assistance in detecting the presence and location of any gas leaks within the structure. Subsequent reports from the Gas Company (GASCO) informed the HFD’s Incident Commander (IC) that the building was not connected to local gas service. Matters were further complicated when pre-incident fire plans verified the absence of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) or synthetic natural gas (SNG) within the building and the lack of occupants who were knowledgeable or familiar with the building and its contents at that late hour. HFD crews began a systematic check of the building in an attempt to locate portable sources of gas. Leads produced no source for the odor. In one area where the odor was detected, HFD personnel considered a methanol-powered vehicle as a potential source. At approximately 0045 hours, the vehicle was removed from its location and HFD crews returned to their apparatuses when an explosion occurred in the building. The explosion tore off the door leading to a communication room on the second floor of the 16-story Hawaii State Office building and sent it flying more than 20 feet from its original location. Scattered debris damaged several adjacent doors and walls throughout the area outside the communication room and also left a cooling unit lodged in a window. Fortunately no one was injured, but two minutes earlier, HFD crews had been in close proximity to the area where the blast occurred. Had personnel not removed the vehicle from its stall when they did, there may have been a tragic outcome. After the explosion, a quick personnel accountability report (PAR) was conducted and all HFD personnel were accounted for. Fire units then extended their investigation to the communication room where the explosion had occurred. High concentrations of SNG were detected coming from a conduit containing fiber optic cables. Earlier test readings around this same room failed to detect any significant gas readings. As a result, the locked communications room was not accessed or investigated. GASCO was notified of the events and a crew was sent to the scene to look for a leak in their lines. It was determined later that SNG from an underground 4-inch line was leaking and the synthetic lighter-than-air product had somehow found its way into the conduit which ran into the communications room. After consulting with the electric and gas companies, power to the area’s entire grid system was shut down. Governor Linda Lingle was out of town, but her residence at the historic Washington Place was affected by the shut down, as some 50 other businesses in the area. Honolulu Police closed streets and redirected traffic while GASCO personnel completed an initial patch of the leaking pipe. At around 1230 hours, some 14 hours after the initial dispatch, streets were reopened and power was restored to the area. GASCO work crews returned the following day to make final repairs.

Lessons Learned:

Although a systematic risk assessment of this scene was conducted by the IC, first-arriving companies to this scene, and both of the Department’s Hazardous Materials Response Teams, this incident shows us that even when we believe we have eliminated all variables and all potential risks identified on our incident action plan (IAP) we should continue to monitor the situation for safety. A revisit of our IAP might be considered to ensure that we have not overlooked any aspect during the preliminary investigation of the scene. During a preliminary post-incident analysis with the first on-scene companies, the IC for this response recapped his thought process and his IAP with his personnel. He reiterated the fact that at any time, if he himself or anyone at the scene determined there were any signs of impending danger, all units would have been alerted and removed from the immediate area of the scene. Speaking emphatically to the two probationary fire fighters who were present in this group, he also reiterated the fact that each individual should not hesitate to notify their superiors of any observation that has the potential to be unsafe. All members present said they will approach any subsequent response to an “odor of gas” with an entirely different set of eyes. The bottom line here is that a systematic approach to any situation is essential; and even when it is applied correctly, there are always variables that may not have been uncovered during the initial size-up. Although safety at the scene is the responsibility of the IC or his/her designee, ultimately, it is the responsibility of everyone who has responded to the scene.