The NFPA has released their report about Firefighter Fatalities in the U.S. 2008.  Rita Fahy, one of the authors, has recently done a podcast if you would like to check it out.  There is also one that Mike Karter has done on the Patterns of Firefighter Fireground Injuries.

http://feeds2.feedburner.com/NFPApodcast
 
PLEASE TAKE NOTE TO AVOID CONFUSION:
...the NFPA calculates LODD's differently that the United States Fire Administration and the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation:
The way the NFPA looks at on-duty (LODD) deaths shows 103 Firefighter LODD's. On the other hand, the USFA's report stated that there were 114 on-duty firefighter fatalities during the same time period.
Based upon the NFPA's determination on an on duty LODD in 2008, a total of 103 on-duty firefighter deaths occurred in the U.S. This is the same number of deaths (using the NFPA calculations) as occurred in the U.S. in 2007, and the fourth time in the last 10 years that the annual total has been 103. The largest share of deaths (39 deaths) occurred while firefighters were responding to or returning from emergency calls. This includes a single incident which resulted in nine deaths. Stress, exertion, and other medical-related issues, which usually result in heart attacks or other sudden cardiac events, continued to account for the largest number of fatalities.

Accoriding to a eport by the Orange County Fire Authority related to last November's devastating Freeway Complex fire, firefighters disregarded orders and put others and themselves at risk, a report released Thursday said.

In the midst of a fire that raced through three canyons and directly into Yorba Linda, off-duty crews commandeered fire engines, driving engines into the firefight without telling superiors what they were doing or where they were going.

Firefighters put themselves and others at risk and handcuffed firefighting options when they failed to follow their chain of command, the report said.
 

The revelations are part of a 128-page report by the Fire Authority that looks at the successes and failures during the Freeway Complex fire and suggests how the county's largest firefighting agency can improve its capabilities in the future.

A total of 203 homes – 117 in Yorba Linda – were destroyed, in the "most catastrophic loss of homes in Orange County since the Laguna Fire in 1993," the report said. An additional 117 residences were damaged, and more than 40,000 people were forced from their homes in the largest fire in Orange County since 1948.

But no one died or was seriously injured, and hundreds of homes were saved by the efforts of more than 3,800 firefighters, the report said.

Three weeks before the Freeway Complex fire broke out Nov. 15, local firefighters held a tabletop exercise that closely resembled the actual fire, giving officials a jump on strategy and tactics.

When the real blaze struck, Battalion Chief Rick Reeder raced from his fire station in Placentia to the fire, calling for extra engines and aircraft miles before he saw flames. Traffic along the 91 freeway could not keep up with the fast-moving head of the fire. A second blaze broke out in Brea less than two hours later, creating a monster.

Four days later, firefighters had reigned in the 30,305-acre blaze.

Of $16.1 million spent to fight the fires, all but $33,000 was reimbursed by state and federal funds. The fires caused an estimated $150 million in damage. The cause of the Corona end of the fire was ruled an accidental spark from a car exhaust along the 91 freeway at Green River. The Brea fire had been sparked by downed powered lines.

Fire officials credited staging of equipment and crews ahead of time, recent tabletop exercises and changes in the state's mutual aid system for a quick response. Within the first four hours of the fire, 159 engines, three trucks, five water tenders, eight helicopters and 10 air tankers were attacking the flames. Forty-one engines were there within the first hour, the report said. But issues with communication and water supply hampered firefighting efforts.

After hundreds of interviews and reviewing hundreds of documents and thousands of radio transmissions, the authors of the postmortem report came up with a wish list of 56 changes, improvements and upgrades.

The major recommendations include improving radio communications, training crews in battling house fires near wildland areas, working with local water agencies to identify and rectify weaknesses in water systems, and developing a rapid-mobilization plan in large-scale emergency situations.

Nearly 18 months after the Santiago fire raced through Orange County's canyons, tight economic times have forced the Fire Authority to postpone several major recommendations after that fire, including replacing its part-time hand crew with a full-time crew and adding a fourth firefighter to wildland engines to meet federal standards. The same recommendations were echoed in the Freeway Complex review.

While several recommendations have been completed or are under way, the ones that cost money, including staffing increases, will likely have to wait. But Fire Chief Chip Prather implored the Fire Authority's board of directors to approve funding as soon as funding was available for the fourth-man staffing and a hand crew, staffing increases he said are imperative to maintaining firefighting safety and effectiveness.

"We have to balance out our No. 1 responsibility, which is public safety, with our responsibility to the taxpayer," Battalion Chief Kris Concepcion said. "As soon as it is economically feasible, we will implement them."

Problems plagued the firefighting effort from the start.

The plan was to pinch off the fire early. But hundreds of gallons of water destined to be dropped by helicopters on the fire had to be diverted and dropped on a Corona fire engine crew that had been overrun by flames after going off-road to try to fight the flames. The Corona crew's decision placed them in a "dangerous position," between the fast-moving fire and unburned brush, the report said. The crew was saved, but flames raced west toward Yorba Linda, throwing embers more than a mile in front of the fire.

"It's an angry fire, and it's not getting any happier," Reeder said. "Are we going to stop it? No. How do we want it and what can we do to make it come into Yorba Linda the way we want it to?"

Two strike teams – a total of 10 fire engines – were ordered by Reeder to stage at Station 53 on East La Palma in Yorba Linda to get ahead of the fire. "In my mind, what was burning in Corona was already done," Reeder said. "It was not the piece to worry about."

Strike team leaders ignored Reeder's order, self-dispatching instead to Corona, the report said. With the original order unfilled, strike teams did not arrive into Yorba Linda until 11 a.m. – nearly 2 hours later. The first Yorba Linda house was already burning.

Command officers have a "certain amount of latitude," Concepcion said. "They must have thought there was something more pressing in Corona," he said.

Fire stations were emptied to fight the Laguna fire in 1993, but entire OCFA battalions were left fully staffed during the Freeway Complex fire, officials said.

"We had two fires burning close to each other, and we didn't know what caused them," Concepcion said. Extra strike teams were ordered from other counties, but it took time for them to arrive.

Off-duty Fire Authority crews were mounting their own defenses, hijacking three engines and heading to the firefight, creating serious safety and accountability issues. Command staff scrambling for extra engines to send to the firefight spent up to 12 hours trying to find the maverick engines, the report said.

"These firefighters are heroes," Fire Authority union President Joe Kerr said. "These firefighters came in off-duty to try to do everything they could to save homes. A lot of homes were saved because of them. You're not going to find more dedication than that."

"We take crew accountability very seriously," Concepcion said. "We want to make sure this never happens again."

The involved firefighters have been interviewed but were not disciplined, Kerr said.

The fire chief and the union plan to send a letter to its employees reminding them that department rules and regulations need to be followed, even during a disaster. Even though the crews were not assigned to work, they were paid, Concepcion said.

Wages are paid at time and a half for nonscheduled workdays. A preliminary report made no mention of the rogue crews.

The fire moved fast.

Santa Ana winds up to 60 mph sent flames hurtling over steep, dry hills – and on a direct path to Yorba Linda. The fire consumed the length of nearly 14 football fields every 60 seconds. More than 10,000 acres burned in the first 12 hours, taking with it hundreds of homes and buildings.

City and county officials failed to activate an automatic telephone alert system. The first calls telling residents to flee the fire didn't go out until after 4 p.m., nearly three hours after the Fire Authority issued a news release stating a "raging wildfire" had destroyed homes in Anaheim Hills, Brea and Yorba Linda.

Dozens of homes continued to burn in Yorba Linda around 2 p.m. as firefighters were also forced to battle low water pressure and dry hydrants on Hidden Hills Road and surrounding streets, the report said.

One strike team leader told Fire Authority Chief Prather that his crews could have saved five to six homes of the dozens of homes burned in the Hidden Hills neighborhood. But without water, the team's five engines were forced to move to lower ground. There, they found hydrants with water and made a stand against the blaze.

Fire Authority water tenders were called in to shuttle water to crews. But the pressure problems also hindered the tenders' efforts, Prather said. Some of the depletion of water pressure was directly attributed to engines drawing thousands of gallons of water a minute from hydrants simultaneously as they desperately dumped water on dozens of homes burn...  [  more  ]  

This is a comprehensive significant injury investigation report performed by the Montgomery County (MD) Fire and Rescue Service in Maryland

Around 1:30 a.m. on October 2, 2008,  E703 (Rockville) was sent to the 200 block of  Frederick Ave., in Rockville for the report of a transformer on fire. Upon arrival they discovered smoke coming from a house located at 219 Frederick Ave. and called for assistance. .  E703 reported a basement fire with fire showing from a basement window.   A ‘House fire’ dispatch assignment and a ‘RID’ (Rapid Intervention Dispatch) was dispatched.  Upon the arrival of other units from FS03 on the scene, an interior attack was initiated by E703 and a Rescue Group was established with a subsequent search of the house performed.  During the search efforts a member from RS703 (the driver) fell through the first floor over the room of origin and into the fire below.  A ‘mayday’ was initiated for the trapped firefighter, and a ‘Task Force’ assignment was requested.  The trapped firefighter was able to self extricate himself from the basement. The injured firefighter was treated on the scene and transported to the Washington Hospital Center, Med Star Burn Unit.  He was hospitalized for an extended period.

The cause of the fire is under investigation and damage is estimated to be $270,000. The fire is believed to have originated in the basement.


The report containS 50 recommendations dealing with - Fire Ground Operations, Risk vs. Benefit Analysis, Accountability, Mayday, Communications, Personnel Training & Certification, Equipment, PPE/SCBA......should be publicly available around on Friday on County website and elsewhere.

Volusia County (FL) County fire officials called it a "freak accident" but state investigators said the death of Volusia County firefighter John Curry during a training exercise was a result of improperly trained firefighters and an unsafe workplace, a report released (see link on this page) shows.

The inquiry into Curry's November 2007 death from a falling tree was done by the state's Bureau of Fire Training & Standards.


The investigation found both Curry and other firefighters -- new members of a unit within the fire department charged with battling forest fires and known as the Firewalkers -- received an abridged version of training rather than the entire package required by the National Wildlife Coordinating Group and the Division of Forestry, the investigation states.


Curry and other new Firewalkers, who had never been on a tree-felling exercise, received some classroom instruction that day before heading out into the field. But the investigation found the classroom instruction time was cut in half -- from four hours to two.

"This team did not utilize the entire training package created by the National Wildlife Coordinating Group," state investigators said. "Instead, they presented a much shorter version including the video and a short discussion period.

"The experienced members supervising the newer members (of the Firewalkers team) were not prepared for an unusual circumstance with fatal consequences."

The 30-year-old Curry was killed by a pine tree that landed on his back. The tree was more than 40 feet tall with a diameter of about 18 inches.

Curry had been assigned to be a swamper and another firefighter was the sawyer. The sawyer is assigned to cut and drop the tree, while the swamper is supposed to watch the top of the tree and tell the sawyer what direction it is leaning as it starts to fall.

Because of the way the sawyer made his cuts, the tree began turning counterclockwise, which caused it to move 135 degrees from the spot where it was supposed to land, the investigation shows. As that was happening, the training instructor was already running down the escape route, the report states.
Curry meanwhile, left the sawyer behind and began bolting down the escape route also, not realizing the tree was already falling in that direction.

"There was no one at the tree to assess the quality and accuracy of the sawyer's cuts, assure the safety of sawyer and swamper, or prevent the victim from running down the escape route to his death," the investigators wrote.

By the time Curry reached the end of the escape route, the tree had already come crashing down on his back, the report states.

The state issued a notice of violation to county Fire Chief Jim Tauber. The notice is designed to allow Tauber and his department to remedy the violations that led to Curry's death.

In a safety violations report dated March 12 that was attached to the investigative report, the state is requiring the county to provide training commensurate to each firefighter and supervisor's task. Furthermore, the county is required to provide documentation showing that all Firewalkers completed the courses required for their job.

Volusia County spokesman Dave Byron said county officials had "thoroughly reviewed" the investigative report and would implement the recommendations. Byron said he could not comment on the training exercise or why procedures were not followed.

Geoff Bichler , an Orlando-based attorney representing Curry's widow, Kristen, said he intends to file a wrongful death claim against the county.

"The only thing they (the county) gave the poor guy was a two-hour video and a chain saw," the attorney said. "The county clearly failed Mr. Curry in every way."

Saturday, April 4, 2008: The
Line of Duty Deaths of 2 Ohio Firefighters.
 
On Friday, April 4, 2008, Captain Robin Broxterman, 37-years-old, a 17-year veteran career firefighter and paramedic, and Firefighter Brian Schira, 29-years-old, a six-month probationary, part-time firefighter and Emergency Medical Technician with Colerain Township (Ohio) Fire & EMS died in the Line of Duty after the floor they were on collapsed into the burning basement at that dwelling fire.  
 
There is ONE IMPORATNT way that ANY Firefighter and Fire Officer can remember them:
 
Following that tragic loss, the Colerain Township Fire/EMS Department issued a preliminary report (link below) with initial and valuable details on what happened based upon the information available at the time.
Critical details such as the importance of size-up, 360 walk around and other information is of great value to any Firefighter and Officer.  A more in-depth final report is being developed and is expected to be released later this year along with the NIOSH report.
 
As stated in the preliminary report  “the department will never forget the ultimate sacrifice made by Captain Robin Broxterman and Firefighter Brain Schira in their service to the community.  By sharing the knowledge gained from this very tragic and painful incident, the Department will ensure their sacrifice was not in vain and hope that other fire departments can avoid a similar tragedy”….
 
Here is that preliminary report which has already proven to have lead to the saving of OTHER Firefighters lives:
http://www.coleraintwp.org/uploads/LODDPriliminaryReportFinalVersion4.pdf

A recent fire known as "Harrow Court" claimed two young Ffs.  This was a fire in a block of flats and when crews arrived they found they had no water save for a 9 litre extinguisher.  Despite being told not to enter, they did and brought out alive one male occupant.  They then re-entered to rfecover a woman but before they could exit a flash over occured and they became trapped in cables that fell from the ceiling. All three died. These cables had been fixed in plastic ducting but not by anything else. Hence as the ducting deformed the cables fell.

HARROW COURT NATIONAL RECOMMENDATION No.1
 
Further to your request for an update on a specific matter I respond as follows:
 
 
1.      National Fire Safety Recommendation No.1: Provision should be made to inform all relevant stakeholders including Local Authorities, Housing Associations and other FRSs of the potential dangers associated with the lack of adequate securing of cables in trunking, particularly any which were installed to the 1988 British Standard.
Action to date: Meetings held with ACO Graham Stag (CFOA FSE Regional Lead Officer), Cath Reynolds (DCLG Fire Research Dept.) and CFO Ian Cox (CFOA FSE National Lead).
Letter dated 22/03/07 sent to CFO Ian Cox for discussion/action at CFOA FSE national committee.
Letter dated 22/03/07 written to BSI technical committee responsible for BS 5839 explaining the importance of securing cables and requesting greater emphasis is placed upon this within relevant standards. Meeting held on 16/05/07 with Colin Todd, BSI Committee member. As a result of this meeting, Colin Todd sent an email to John Fisher (BSI FSH/12/1 secretary) recommending that the forthcoming amendment to BS 5839 has a suitable enhancement of text relating to fire alarm cable support. Draft amendment of sub clause 26.1, 26.2(f) and 46.2(b)(5) was recommended for consideration by FSH 12/1 committee.
 
As a result of this work, BS 5839-1 has had amendments made on 31/03/08:
 
The current and latest edition of the fire detection and alarm standard is
BS 5839-1: 2002+A2: 2008. The following clauses relate to the changes made as a result of the Harrow Court recommendations:
 
26.1(A2)Commentary: Unless cables are supported in such a manner that they remain supported for the duration similar to that for which the cable itself can survive a fire, early failure of the circuit might occur because of strain on terminations as a result of collapsing cables.
 
26.2 Recommendations, (f) Note 9 (A2): Experience has shown that collapse of cables, supported only by plastic cable trunking, can create a serious hazard to firefighters, who could become entangled in cables.
 
46.2(b)(5): Note 2 (A2): Serious shortcomings in cable support that could result in collapse of a significant length of cable in the event of fire should also be regarded as a major non-compliance.
 

This is the Loudoun County Department of Fire, Rescue, and Emergency Management Significant Injury Investigative Report for 43238 Meadowood Court. The Department is sharing the Report in an effort to reduce and prevent firefighter injuries and Line of Duty Deaths (LODDs) across the County, regionally, statewide, and nationally.
On May 25, 2008, fire and rescue personnel from Loudoun County responded to a structure fire at 43238 Meadowood Court in Leesburg, Virginia. During the course of the incident, seven responders were injured. Of those injured, four firefighters received significant burn injuries, two firefighters sustained orthopedic injuries, and one EMS provider was treated for minor respiratory distress. To date, five of the injured personnel have returned to duty. Two firefighters continue to recover from their injuries, including one who was severely burned.
Given the severity of the injuries and magnitude of the event, an independent Investigative Team was assembled to review the incident. The Team was comprised of four Loudoun County personnel, three external members from area fire departments, and two resource/support personnel. The Team was tasked with reviewing “the events leading up to the incident, the incident operation(s), the firefighter MAYDAY(s), and incident mitigation.”
For three months, the Team thoroughly examined the events surrounding the Meadowood Court fire incident and identified the factors associated with the injury of personnel. The Report contains the results of the Investigative Team’s comprehensive review and analysis. All of the information presented is factual and was validated prior to inclusion in the document. Recommendations are provided throughout the Report in an effort to provide a framework to enhance and improve the Loudoun County Fire and Rescue System, as well as protect responder and citizen safety.

The report on OSU Fire Service Training's fatality is below

The United States Fire Administration (USFA) worked with the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) in a project to enhance risk management capability of local fire departments. The goal of this initiative was to enable fire departments to design effective risk management programs based on community hazards and service commitment, enhance firefighter safety, and provide tools for continual evaluation of emergency response systems. The ability of fire departments to design an acceptable level of resource deployment based on risks and service commitment and to provide tools for continual evaluation of emergency response systems is crucial in the enhancement of firefighter operational safety and occupational health. The adequate placement of firefighting resources also supports the reduction in civilian fire fatalities. This study examined critical issues related to adequate resource deployment tying them to the development of effective risk management programs. Geographic information systems (GIS) computer simulation was used to develop staffing and deployment models that will be recommended for department of various sizes serving different populations in varying geographic regions. The first phase of the analyzed retrospective data from the years 2000-2005 to identify and quantify the major factors that contribute to fire fighter line-of-duty death (LODD) in the United States. The identified contributing factors were examined for frequency of occurrence and clustering with other factors. The results are to be used to develop risk management programs for fire departments. This first phase used data compiled from six years of verified firefighter on-duty fatalities from four reputable industry sources. Sources included the United States Fire Administration (USFA) as well as the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), and the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF). For each LODD, factors contributing to the death were recorded from Federal investigations and eyewitness reports. The contributing factors were then analyzed for frequency of occurrence and clustering with other factors. Contributing factor clusters identified include the following. Cluster #1 includes incident command, training, communications, standard operating procedures, and pre-incident planning. Cluster #2 includes vehicles, personal protective equipment, equipment failure, and human error. Cluster #3 includes private owned vehicle, accidents, and civilian error. Cluster #4 includes company staffing/crew size, standard operating guidelines and health/fitness/wellness. Clustering information is being used to develop risk management recommendations for local fire departments. From the first phase of this study, the following report, Contributing Factors to Firefighter Line of Duty Death in the United States was developed by the IAFF. This second phase of the study will also address effective risk management programs for the fire service as the same methodology will be used to assess firefighter on-duty injury. Data sources for phase II are being sought. Click the story title to download the report.

As you are aware, Technician (Firefighter) Kyle Wilson of the Prince William County (VA) Department of Fire & Rescue was killed in the Line of Duty when he heroically gave his life at a single family dwelling fire on April 16, 2007. Below are links to all sections of the report including audio, video, fire modeling and related information. Don't BLOW THIS CHANCE to educate all of your members with this outstanding report provided by Fire Chief Kevin McGee & the Prince William Fire & Rescue Department... the audio, the video, the modeling ...all of it can make a significant difference to any and all Firefighters. For example, within the audio, you will hear the chilling radio transmissions of Firefighter Wilson advising that he was trapped, with his words: “Mayday, Mayday, Mayday, Tower 512 bucket, I’m trapped inside, I don’t know where I am, I’m somewhere in the stairwell, I need someone to come get me out!!” By the time firefighters were able to get to Firefighter Kyle Wilson it was too late. Prince William County Fire & Rescue is saving future lives by sharing their LODD Investigative report to honor Kyle, in an effort to reduce and prevent firefighter line of duty deaths at the local, region, state, and national levels. Technician Wilson joined the Prince William County Department of Fire and Rescue on January 23, 2006. Tragically, he died in the line of duty on April 16, 2007 while performing search and rescue operations at a house fire. On that day, Technician Wilson was part of the firefighter staffing on Tower 512 which responded to the house fire that was dispatched at 0603 hours. The Prince William County area was under a high wind advisory as a nor’eastern storm moved through the area. Sustained winds of 25 mph with gusts up to 48 mph were prevalent in the area at the time of the fire dispatch to Marsh Overlook Drive. Initial arriving units reported heavy fire on the exterior of two sides of the single family house and crews had every reason to believe that occupants were still inside the house sleeping because of the early morning hour. A search of the upstairs bedroom commenced for the possible victims. A rapid and catastrophic change of fire and smoke conditions occurred in the interior of the house within minutes of Tower 512’s crew entering the structure. Technician Wilson became trapped and was unable to locate an immediate exit out of the hostile environment. Mayday radio transmissions were made by crews and by Technician Kyle Wilson of the life-threatening situation. Valiant, heroic and repeated rescue attempts to locate and remove Technician Wilson were made by the firefighting crews during extreme fire, heat and smoke conditions. Firefighters were forced from the structure as the house began to collapse on them and intense fire, heat and smoke conditions developed. Technician Wilson succumbed to the fire and the cause of death was reported by the medical examiner to be thermal and inhalation injuries. Virginia Occupational Safety and Health (VOSH) and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) performed independent investigations of the Marsh Overlook fire incident. VOSH’s investigation is complete and closed with no citations or corrective orders being issued. NIOSH’s investigation results are still pending. The major factors in the line of duty death of Technician I Wilson were determined to be: • The initial arriving fire suppression force size. • The size up of fire development and spread. • The impact of high winds on fire development and spread. • The large structure size and lightweight construction and materials. • The rapid intervention and firefighter rescue efforts. • The incident control and management. The weather conditions and construction features resulted in the rapid and catastrophic progression of fire conditions. The organizational preparation and response to incidents of this nature can and are recommended to be improved with the majority of recommendations focused on staffing, training, procedures, and communications. The below links will provide you with significant amounts of information so that our own members can listen, read, learn and study how this happened-and what your FD can do so history is not repeated. PW LODD Report Fact Sheet- http://www.pwcgov.org/vpresentations/fnr/LODDReportFactSheet.pdf PW LODD Investigative Report- http://www.pwcgov.org/vpresentations/fnr/LODDReport.pdf PW LODD Report Presentation- http://www.pwcgov.org/vpresentations/fnr/LODDReportPresentation.pdf PW LODD Report Basic House Model- http://www.pwcgov.org/vpresentations/fnr/LODDReportBasicHouseModelSection1.wmv PW LODD Report Audio and Video- http://www.firecamera.com/index.cfm?Section=4&pagenum=259&titles=0 LODD Death Report Fire Model- http://www.pwcgov.org/vpresentations/fnr/LODDReportFireModelSection3.wmv All of the above links are from: http://www.pwcgov.org/default.aspx?topic=040026000110004566 We, once again have another Fire Department that is stepping up and providing the facts so we can learn...we have no option but to take full advantage of it. Take care-BE CAREFUL. PLEASE DON'T BLOW THIS CHANCE TO EDUCATE ALL YOUR MEMBERS.

Washington, DC, January 30, 2008 - On the first anniversary of a fatal propane explosion at a West Virginia convenience store, the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) today announced that testing has been completed on a key propane valve and outlined other issues that will be examined in the final investigation report. The accident on January 30, 2007, at the Little General Store in Ghent killed four people and injured six others when propane gas was suddenly released through a liquid withdrawal valve during a changeover between two propane tanks. A volunteer firefighter and an EMT who responded to reports of the leak were among those killed when the propane cloud ignited, destroying the store. The CSB has examined and tested the valve and found that on the day of the accident the valve was stuck in an open position. Investigators are continuing their examination of regulatory and code compliance as well as West Virginia's gas safety practices. 'This investigation is about more than figuring out what went wrong with the valve, it is about getting to the root cause of this accident and preventing a similar incident from occurring,' said CSB Lead Investigator Jeffrey Wanko, P.E., C.S.P. On the day of the accident, a technician working for Appalachian Heating (a company that had a business arrangement with Thompson Gas) was preparing to switch propane service to Thompson Gas from a previous propane vendor, Ferrellgas. As part of the process, the technician was to transfer propane from the Ferrellgas tank to the newly installed one. The Ferrellgas tank was located against the store's outside rear wall. The Thompson Gas tank was located about ten feet away. While preparing for the transfer, propane began flowing out of the liquid withdrawal valve on the Ferrellgas tank located next to the store. Lead Investigator Jeffrey Wanko said, 'The placement of the tank facilitated gas entering the building and the ignition of the flammable gas and contributed to the high number of injuries and fatalities.' The tank did not comply with National Fire Protection Association or Occupation Safety and Health Administration siting specifications which require that a propane tank be placed 10 feet from the building. Investigators believe personnel involved in the installation of a new propane tank at the store removed a metal screw cap on the liquid withdrawal valve, in preparation for removing propane from the old tank. The malfunctioning withdrawal valve leaked, resulting in an uncontrollable release. The technician was unable to stop the flow and placed a 9-1-1 emergency call at 10:40 a.m. CSB investigators found that in common with many states, West Virginia does not require technicians who install propane tanks to receive any formal training. The CSB is also examining the practices of 9-1-1 emergency call centers to provide basic emergency instructions for flammable gas incidents such as proper evacuation procedures. In this instance, Little General employees stayed in the building during the gas release. The CSB's final report and safety recommendations are expected to be complete in mid-2008. The CSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating industrial chemical accidents. The agency's board members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. CSB investigations look into all aspects of chemical accidents, including physical causes such as equipment failure as well as inadequacies in regulations, industry standards, and safety management systems.

This is a the report from the Santa Clara County Fire Department on the death of Fire Captain Mark McCormack, who was electricuted on a structure fire in 2005. On February 13, 2005 at 02:20, the Santa Clara County Fire Department (CNT) responded to a reported large single-family residential structure fire at 15700 Blossom Hill Road in Los Gatos, California. The following resources were committed to the incident. From CNT: 6 engines, 1 haz-mat, 1 truck, 1 rescue, 2 Battalion Chiefs, and 9 volunteers. From Saratoga Fire District (SAR): 1 engine, 1 rescue and an acting Battalion Chief. Mutual aid from the San Jose Fire Department (SJS): 3 engines, 2 trucks, and a Battalion Chief. From the County Overhead Support Team: 4 members. The fire consumed approximately 80% of the main fire building. During the event, CNT Engine 10 Fire Captain Mark McCormack lost his life when he came into contact with a downed 12kv (12,000 volt) power line that had burned through early in the incident. Following contact with the wire, he was immediately extricated from the area, received advanced life support, and was transported to Good Samaritan Hospital.

This is the departmental report of findings from the fatality accident that occurred August 6, 2005 with a Line of Duty Death of the Riverside County, Calif. Fire Department Apparatus Crash-Ejection of Firefighter (download)

(FFCC.com notes: For ALL NIOSH Firefighter Fatality reports, go to: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/firehome.html ) June 1, 2005-NIOSH has released a report on the death of Thomas Brick, a New York City firefighter, who died in a warehouse fire in December 2003. The fire broke out on December 16 at a furniture and mattress warehouse in upper Manhattan. While entering the building, the crew encountered heavy smoke and no visibility in a stairwell. Brick and his crew continued to the second floor, seeking the origin of the fire. As a result of a recent delivery, inventory was stacked as high as the ceiling in some places. Brick became separated from his crew during the search. An officer ordered the team to leave due to high heat conditions and an announcement was made that a member was missing. But outside, Brick was accidentally accounted for and the emergency message was cancelled. When a final check discovered that Brick was still missing, colleagues went to try and rescue him. He was found face down with the face piece of his respirator off. Brick was flown to a hospital where he was pronounced dead. NIOSH recommends that to reduce the chance of similar incidents, fire departments should: Ensure that pre-incident commanders conduct a risk-versus-gain analysis before committing firefighters to an interior operation, and continue the analysis during the operation Use guidelines and ropes securely attached to permanent objects and/or a bright, narrow-beamed light at all entries to a structure to guide firefighters during emergency exits. Instruct firefighters in the hazards of exposure to carbon monoxide and warn them never to remove their face pieces in areas in which these hazards are likely to exist. Establish a system to facilitate the reporting of unsafe conditions or code violations observed by firefighters during operations.

By Avis Thomas-Lester Washington Post Staff Writer Sunday, May 1, 2005; C01 The fire scene in Oxon Hill was already chaotic when word came that a career firefighter, Lt. Elmer "Dino" Mahaffey, was trapped on the second floor of the brick rowhouse. Already, key information hadn't been shared with firefighters in the house. And the volunteer chief running the scene hadn't set up a rescue team or Mayday procedures for the career and volunteer crews there. Once firefighters learned about Mahaffey, some left their posts without permission, or "freelanced," churning up more turmoil as black smoke billowed and the fire spread, according to a report released last month on the Feb. 22, 2004, blaze. The highly critical report, prepared by top officials of the Prince George's County Fire Department, draws no conclusion on whether the chaos contributed to Mahaffey's injuries. He spent 26 days in intensive care after his throat and lungs were severely burned and has not returned to duty. But it does point to repeated mistakes on the day of the fire and deeper flaws in the department's training and certification process. And it raises broader questions about the working relationship between career and volunteer firefighters in a county that has morphed from rural to urban in the past 25 years. Prince George's has about 1,500 fire service personnel -- 600 career firefighters and paramedics and 900 volunteers, officials said, making it one of the largest hybrid fire departments in the country. Many Washington suburbs operate similar agencies. In Prince George's, volunteer units own 71 of the 93 fire engines and 32 of the 44 fire stations, giving them considerable influence in the department. At times, a volunteer chief can wield authority over career personnel and serve as "incident commander" at a scene. Some career firefighters bristle at this arrangement, suggesting that they are held to higher standards for training and hiring. For them, the turbulent scene described in the Oxon Hill fire report and the criticism the report directs at volunteer commander Darryl E. Lowery validate their concerns. Lowery disputed the report's findings, saying that the scene was no different from others he has run and that he is being used as a scapegoat by the department's career leaders. "This is their way of shifting the blame from themselves to the volunteer firefighters," he said. "This is not the first time that something has gone wrong in incident command, but as a volunteer, you are going to get more criticism than the career side." The report's authors recommended that the department "increase the minimum standards to be an incident commander" for volunteer and career firefighters alike. They also suggested that incident commanders be designated by the fire chief and held "accountable and responsible for their action or inactions." Fire Chief Lawrence H. Sedgwick Jr., who was involved in the investigation before being promoted last year to lead the department, said no one has been disciplined as a result of the probe. But the department has changed its procedures, requiring more of the most senior career firefighters to be on duty 24 hours a day. "What we've done with the report is use it as a training tool," Sedgwick said. For Mahaffey, 35, the implications are personal. He remains at home recuperating from his injuries and is scheduled to have another operation May 20. He worries that he will be forced to retire. He said he has not read the report but believes that poor supervision and substandard equipment -- the department has none of the thermal imaging devices that could have sped the search of the second floor-- contributed to his injury. "There is a lot of freelancing and not a lot of discipline in the firefighters that the department as a whole has known about, but they chose not to correct it," said Mahaffey, his words broken by fits of coughing. "Was it Lowery's fault? Yes, because he could have taken it upon himself to do the right thing. But it wasn't all his fault, because it's just how the department operates." Lowery's role at the Oxon Hill fire was to coordinate the various career and volunteer crews there. Mahaffey's career unit, Quint 21, was charged with search and rescue operations. Within a few minutes on the scene, Lowery notified dispatch: "We have the occupants of the residence out of the house," the report says. But that information was not shared with Mahaffey and his team inside the house. Nor were there any radio transmissions alerting firefighters that flames had moved from the basement to the first floor, the report states. Mahaffey and another firefighter were on the second floor when they noticed the heat. "We go down the hallway to go down the steps, and I see fire on the steps," he recalled. Mahaffey issued a Mayday call on his radio and, receiving no response, opened a window and began waving his arms at firefighters on the ground. Flames burst from a first-floor window below, knocking him back inside. His breathing apparatus became dislodged, leaving him to inhale gases, smoke and heated air, the report says. Career and volunteer firefighters ran from other parts of the house to rescue him, bringing him down a ladder from the window. The report commends the rescuers but criticizes some for leaving their posts without permission. It also faults Lowery, saying he failed to initiate rescue procedures, to ensure that firefighters continued to suppress the fire during the rescue and to adequately supervise the fire scene. The report does not recommend specific disciplinary measures against Lowery or any other firefighters. Earlier this year, Lowery was placed on "non-operational status" in Prince George's after he was charged with misdemeanor theft for allegedly stealing gasoline for his car from county gas pumps, court documents show. On Monday in Prince George's District Court, Lowery agreed to pay $18 to cover the price of the gas, and the county state's attorney declined to prosecute. Lowery, who works as a firefighter for the National Institutes of Health, said in an interview that the historic conflict between career and volunteer firefighters had fueled an effort to falsely accuse and discredit him. "I have worked to save lots of people," he said. Lowery remains on non-operational status pending an administrative review of the gas incident by the county's Public Safety Office. Public Safety Director Vernon Herron said he plans to review policies on background checks, training and performance standards for career and volunteer firefighters. Currently, volunteer chiefs are voted in by their respective stations after meeting certain requirements. Career chief positions are typically filled with the most experienced personnel. Career firefighters are required to take random drug tests, but volunteers are tested only after an automobile crash or other major emergency, officials said. Of the 1.1 million firefighters nationally, about 300,000 are career and 800,000 are volunteers, according to the National Fire Protection Association in Quincy, Mass. More than 80 percent of the nation's 26,000 fire departments are volunteer operations, including those in Southern Maryland. Montgomery, Anne Arundel, Howard, Arlington, Fairfax and Prince William counties operate combination departments; the District has only career firefighters.