I was detailed to an upper county station and assigned to ride the engine. A call came in for a field fire about 10 minutes from the station. The brush truck responded, with me riding on the right. Once we got there, we were directed by the farmer\'s family, to an area about a half a mile away from the road. When we got on scene, there was a utility truck fully envolved sitting right next to a pole. There were high tension power lines over head, coming from the power plant. There was mutual aid stations responding from a nearby county. They stretched hand lines, as did I and another firefighter. Myself and the other firefighter from my station had a really good angle on putting this fire out quickly. The mutual aid company was only hitting the side of the tool box area, doing absolutly nothing for the fire. So, my partner I and I hit this and had very good success putting the fire out. Little did we know that the power line we continued to cross over again and again, (at first we had STRONG impression it was connected to the spool on a truck on the high ground being dead)was VERY charged. When my partner hit the line with water, it lit up the night sky! The safety officer was there and ordered us to shut down and return to the top of the hill. He then told us there was no life safety and the fire was controlled, we should have let it go and get out of the "attack" mode mind set

LESSONS LEARNED: With that being said, I learned to look around, there was a reason the "other" county department was not doing anything. I was a victim of the type A personality that told me do something, don\'t stand there. GET OUT OF THE TUNNEL VISION OF PUTTING THE FIRE OUT, HURRY! I almost lost my life that day and I was in Iraq in my previous life, so death was a daily reality for me. Not that I live wreckless, but I had the hero complex and with my military background, it was telling me to attack.

It was March 18 2009 my self and a forestry crew of 6 were on a forest fire in Jonson County KY, the fire started out small when we arrived so we saddled up and started the attack the dozer operator that was a retired forest ranger and a long friend of my family cut the dozer line to the top of the hill we were planning out the attack and he said guys something doesn't feel right im going to get off the hill you should come to myself and 2 others stated putting in our hand lines just as we were told the ranger and another crew member walked over the rock facing to start the other attack the wind started picking up and the fire was growing hotter and faster, when we got our line in I took the chainsaw and was cutting dead trees and scrubs out so the fire wouldn't jump our lines. When I looked back up all we could see is a wall of fire so we started to run as fast as we could I threw my chainsaw down the other guys had a blower and a drip torch in hand they threw their things down as well as we were deploying our fire shelters I was trying to maintain radio contact with our boss the ranger and got no reply I tried for 20 minutes or longer and got nothing when the wind died down he finally replied to my mayday he said that the fire was to large for a crew that small to even try to control and told us that the fire was up in the canopy of the trees that we needed to get off the hill as soon as possible. When we reached the trucks the dozer operator was in panic he said that he couldn't even hear what we was saying the roar of the fire was so great. As we were leaving it started to rain and I told the boss that I was actually scared for my life that day . He said son I was scared for the crew and not myself if you don't come home I don't come home when you make it home I make it home when we made it back to our standby location we were talking about what had happened that day and the office said that we didn't even need to be there because that was our 4th fire that day and we were to small of a crew to even be on fires.

LESSONS LEARNED:

The things that I leard was to not over exhaust the crew, and to listen to what the wise old owl of the crew says even know we are much younger and more energetic.

I was assigned to a division on initial attack of a vegetation fire. On arrival we had a slow moving fire in leaf duft and fire in the tree canopy. I instructed my crews to place a hose lay around the perimeter of the fire to meet up with division A and specifically instructed them to stay out of the black to avoid snags. At this time, I noticed a freelancing firefighter from the other division wandering into the black to perform mop up on several burning stumps. At this time a large burning tree limb fell striking the firefighter in the head and knocking him to the ground. He sustained minor contusions to his head, most of the trauma was avoided by use of his helmet but he also sustained some 2nd degree burns to his face and neck from the ember shower.

Lessons Learned: When fire reaches the tree canopy you cannot wander into burned areas much like a collapse zone on a building. Trees that have been burn are greatly weakened and will fall on you with sometimes fatal results. 8 firefighters have been killed by snags in the last 10 years. Avoid the black, work indirect fire attack and stay out of areas that need snag hazard mitigation. Timber fires are not grass and brush fires.

Yesterday a Boiling Spring Lakes fire truck caught on fire inside the out of control blaze of St. James Plantation.

The truck stalled out while firefighters were responding to the fire. The firefighters made it out unharmed, but the truck burned to a crisp. According to the fire department, the truck is covered by insurance, but the state wants to look into why it got so close to the flames in the first place.

Boiling Spring Lakes was one of seven fire departments to respond yesterday.

Subject: PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT SAFETY Area of Concern: RETARDANT/SUPPRESSANT APPLICATION Discussion: On August 27, 2008 a Single Engine Airtanker (SEAT) crashed on the Flat Bush Fire, Northwest of Meeker, Colorado. Debris from the accident damaged two federal wildland fire engines and narrowly missed the six crewmembers. The approach to the drop brought the SEAT over the location where the engines and crewmembers were staged. Aerial supervisors and incident pilots constantly work with ground crews to ensure drop areas are clear of personnel prior to dropping retardants or suppressants. The lesson learned here is that when applicable, we need to apply this measure of safety to personnel and equipment located in and around the aircraft’s final approach and departure path. This can be accomplished by working through the aerial supervisor or communicating directly with the tanker/helicopter pilot to safely relocate personnel and equipment. Don’t assume that aerial resources can always see you. If you have concerns communicate them immediately. Additional information on retardant use and effectiveness can be reviewed in the Aviation portion of the Incident Response Pocket Guide (IRPG).

Just passing along a sobering reminder about how quickly and how badly (could have been a lot worse) being in the wrong place at the wrong time on a wildfire can be. Ray Holk poses atop what's left of his vehicle after a fire weakened Douglas Fir broke off and fell onto the road where he and another firefighter had just parked to checkout some of the fire.  They heard the tree crack as they stepped out and ran hard to get away.  This was truly a close call.  Another vehicle had pulled away from this spot a few seconds before.

This is on the Kitson Fire, on the Willamette National Forest.  It happened about 4:30 PM on September 26, 2008.

My engine company had been assigned to work on a fire in the Northern California area. The date of the incident, July 15,2008 at about 1800. We were assigned to support a critical backfiring operation on the division we were assigned. There was a Type II Fire Hand crew from Alaska that was put in charge of the burning operation for the evening. I was asked to walk down a trail and assist with water support, due to the fact that the intensity of the fire had increased in the area. Throughout the course of the fire we had been unable to secure the proper LCES protocols due to the terrain and fuels on the fireground. Somehow the communications were not passed on that we needed to stay off from the trail, another issue was the fact that communications to cease all burning operations had also not been properly conveyed. My engine company proceeded down the trail as was requested by the STL on the division. As I led the two other people from my engine down the trail, we encounter a few large pockets of smoke that were very thick and white in color. This was not a great deal of concern at the time, the firing operation was being done on a mid-slope with burning down hill to create a backing fire. We noted that a hose line had blown on our way down the trail, as we came through the third large patch of smoke, everything turned black. We then realized that we were in trouble and we had fire coming right at us. Within a matter of a few seconds we had flames all the way around us and lapping over our heads. I instructed my crew to run back toward the blown hose and seek cover under the water curtain that it was providing. We had two choices at this time, make it back to the blown hose or deploy a fire shelter. We were able to reach the blown line after running about 150 feet, we stayed under the water curtain while the flame front pushed passed us. After the flame front passed we were then able to push up hill and out of any further harm. We all did what we were trained to do, covered our airway and get out of the heat. I am happy to say that other than a few mild burns, scorched hair and delamination of my right boot we were able to escape major injury. After going back to the site of the burn over, we found that we had been walking across the top of a narrow canyon. We were later informed that there had been a great deal of roll out causing fire to establish itself in the bottom of the canyon, causing the large push below us. I can honestly say that this was a close call, I have never felt heat like this in the seven years that I have fought wild land fire or the four years that I have fought structural fire.

LESSONS LEARNED:
Communications should be conveyed properly at all times. If you have any doubt that communications are not understood, please take the time to ask. Take the time to have good crew cohesion, the fact I did not have any of the firefighters I was in charge of question me made it easier to provide a safer outcome. LCES, 10 Standard Fire Orders are there for a reason, just because you follow the rules does not mean that every crew on your fire will do the same. Be safe in all you do.... we all go home, every time!!!

McClatchy-Tribune Information Services -- Unrestricted (July 22, 2008)
The skies were blue and calm on a sun-splashed afternoon as firefighters took a break while waiting for aerial support to help them fight a wildfire in the mountainous Buffalo Cove region of northeastern Caldwell County. That tranquility came to an abrupt halt with one loud boom. The fire they had been fighting was no longer as significant as the fight for survival of eight men who were struck by lightning,

Three of the eight are firefighters from Caldwell County. They, like their five companions, survived the unexpected strike, but it left an indelible mark on them. Their injuries serve as a reminder of nature's awesome power.

Caldwell County Assistant Ranger Ken Robbins and firefighters Alex Smith and Travis Coffey realize how fortunate they were to survive the strike, which came from nowhere. No thunderstorm activity was reported in the general vicinity of their location on that June 28 day, and they had no warning they were in danger until it was too late.

Lightning hit a snag, ran through its root system and underground to the area the eight men were resting.

"I heard a loud clap, about 10 times louder than any explosive I've ever heard; it was deafening," Robbins recalled. "Everything happened so fast; it was too late to react. The next thing I knew, all the guys were on the ground. Once it hit me, I couldn't get up. It knocked me about 10 feet from where I was."

Robbins remembered his feet burning, "like they were on fire," and pain coursing through his legs. What he felt was similar to what others around him felt when their bodies also were charged with electricity brought on by the strike that churned a trench toward them.

Smith, an 18-year-old who just graduated from high school June 6, was serving as a pre-arranged firefighter for the North Carolina Forest Service that day. He was sitting idle when the bolt jolted him.

"My legs tightened up; they were tingling really bad," Smith said. "To be honest, I looked down to make sure my legs were still there."

But Smith was more concerned about others around him, primarily his buddy Preston Story, a smoke chaser for the N.C. Forest Service's District 2 office in Lenoir who also was working the fire that day.

"I immediately was wondering where he was and if he had been struck, too," Smith said. "(Story) was checking the fire line and was not there when the strike hit."

Story was fortunate. Travis Coffey was not. Like Robbins and Smith, the Caldwell County EMS paramedic and Hudson firefighter found himself dealing with a charge of electricity that was sent through his body.

"I didn't see it, I didn't hear it. The first thing that popped in my mind was that my legs were on fire and hurting," said Coffey, also serving as a pre-arranged firefighter for the NCFS that day. "I couldn't move from the chest down. I remember I went flying backward, and it felt like I'd been struck by a train."

When he came to his senses, Coffey said he looked around and saw his fellow firefighters lying on the ground, just as he was, and he heard some of them screaming in pain, crying out in agony as they dealt with the strike.

"I heard someone scream, "Are we going to die?' and I said, 'We're alive, and we're going to be OK,'" Coffey recalled.

As the incident commander, Robbins said he was intent on making sure the firefighters injured were given as much medical attention as could be given in such a remote area, and he noted how Coffey responded to help the others. Robbins radioed for assistance once he had a full grasp on the situation, and the task of moving injured firefighters through the steep and rocky terrain some two miles out of the woods began.

A Kubota all-terrain vehicle was used to carry the injured firefighters out of the woods, but it took some 45 minutes to get them to a transport area and waiting ambulances. Then the ATV was taken back in to bring out the rest of the injured men.

"My main goal was to see to it that those men got out of the woods," said Robbins, one of the last to leave. "I was the incident commander, and I was not leaving the scene until I knew my men were out OK. I was responsible for them. I would not go out until the last man was out. That's just how I do business."

The men were hospitalized, some for several days. Coffey was treated and released, but Robbins spent two days and Smith three in the hospital. Their primary injuries were burns to the feet and legs, and Smith spent an extra day in the hospital because his enzyme levels needed to be monitored.

Smith said things could have been much worse for those involved in the harrowing events of that fateful day.

"You always think about what could have happened," he said. "I'd rather not gone through it, but I'm glad it wasn't any worse than it was."

There certainly was that possibility, especially with the unpredictable nature of lightning.

"Lightning can be a likely source of death, and I have a great respect for it," Coffey said. "I've been close to (lightning) before, but when you actually feel it, it wakes you up and lets you know it's something you can't control."

That was the case with this incident. There were no signs of any impending danger for the firefighters, and yet they ended up in the hospital because of a freak occurrence.

"I've always respected thunder and lightning; we have to respect Mother Nature," Robbins said. "But this was just a freak accident. We had no control over it. It was just one of those things that happened, and we all were lucky."

Smith and Coffey shared that assessment of the situation.

"God was definitely watching over every one of us that day," Smith said. "Everyone on that mountain is lucky to be alive."

Coffey added, "It gave us all a wakeup call that we're not promised tomorrow. For all of us to come out with just the injuries we had, we were just very fortunate."

But none of the three injured firefighters from Caldwell County would change anything about that day or the careers they have chosen in fire and rescue service.

"It's my job, and I love it," Robbins said. "I'd go right back to the same fire under the same conditions we were working in the day it happened. This is the first time I've known of anything to happen like this, but it's part of the job and what we do."

Smith still plans to pursue a career in fire/rescue despite his brush with nature's power.

"I'm going to stay involved; it's what I want to do," he said. "But when you walk outside now and hear a thunderstorm, you start thinking, 'Do I really want to go out in this?' It's not like I'm going to hide or anything, but it is in the back of my mind."

Coffey can't shake the thought, either.

"I'm not skittish about the fire and rescue service, but lightning is a little different story," he said. "I've got my gear packed and ready to go for the next fire, but this is something I'll always remember for the rest of my life."

While the strike itself stands out and always will, Robbins said the prompt attention and support given to the injured firefighters by medical and rescue personnel and others simply expressing their concern is what he won't forget.

"We had a lot of people there that day who volunteered their time to help us out," Robbins said. "I'm glad that I can help someone in need of help, and I'm glad there were people there that day to help us. There have been a lot of prayers that have gone out for us, and a lot of people have offered well wishes and shown us support. I'm grateful for that and very thankful for those people who have shown that concern. That means a lot."

And it means a lot to the firefighters to know they did not experience their demise in the mountains of Buffalo Cove.

On July 7 this year, we reached the number of deaths in wildland fire operations for 2008 that we experienced during all of 2007.  A total of nine wildland firefighters died in the line of duty in 2007 and nine have died so far this year.  That’s nine people who won’t be going home to their families and friends after work anymore.  We need to keep these fallen heroes – and the ones lost in previous years -- in our hearts and minds as we continue our work in what promises to be a long, difficult fire season across the nation.

Causes of death for wildland firefighters in 2008 have included the following:

• vehicle accident (2 deaths when a burned bridge collapsed)
• aviation accidents (1 SEAT pilot; 1 firefighter in a midair collision)
• roadside accident (2 struck by a vehicle in heavy smoke)
• unknown, possible heart attack or aneurysm (2 deaths)
• drowning. (1 death while swimming on R&R)

Many more accidents have been experienced by wildland firefighters in 2008 that did not result in fatalities, but easily could have.  Twenty-four firefighters were injured in four separate vehicle accidents; 19 firefighters became entrapped on seven different occasions, with many of those individuals suffering burn injuries; 10 firefighters were injured when lightning struck nearby in two separate incidents; three firefighters suffered burn injuries in separate events that were not entrapments; two dozer operators were injured in separate rollovers; a firefighter was hit by a snag.  These are just some of the accidents reported in the NWCG Safety Gram; many other accidents and near misses have occurred both on the ground and in the air in 2008.

Entrapments are worthy of special mention.  The 19 firefighters who became entrapped this year were on fires in five different states.  Only three of the 19 entrapped firefighters got their fire shelters out; many others were in vehicles when entrapped – specifically engines, dozers and tractor/plows.  Many of these firefighters suffered burn injuries.  During all of 2007, a total of 53 firefighters were entrapped, and we are on pace to reach or exceed that number in 2008.  Many of the firefighters entrapped in 2007 and 2008 are still recovering from their burn injuries and some have left the fire service.

Mitigations exist for all of the hazards that have led to fatal accidents and near misses this year.  Some of these are:

• Scout roads when in unfamiliar territory in low visibility; be aware of load limits and bridge condition when operating fire apparatus.
• Exercise extreme caution when working near a roadside, especially in low visibility conditions.  Make yourself as visible as possible.
• Do not enjoy a false sense of security when working near or in a vehicle on the fireline.  Survival during a burnover is not guaranteed while in any type of vehicle; vehicles and aircraft are not always reliable as an escape route.  Always identify a secondary escape route.
• Rapid, unexpected changes in fire behavior kill wildland firefighters.  Always identify the worst case scenario and be prepared for it by maintaining focused situation awareness and using LCES.
• Do not hesitate to use your fire shelter if you feel you need to.  If you become entrapped, there will be some type of review or investigation regardless of whether you deploy a shelter or not.
• Maintain physical fitness and monitor your health regularly through medical exams.
• Only swim in designated safe areas while on fire assignments.

All wildland firefighters want to survive this fire season without injury.  So did all the people who have been injured or killed to date.  You are responsible for your safety and the safety of your fellow firefighters.  Maintain your health, manage fatigue, stay hydrated, be actively involved in briefings and fireline communication, and keep your head in the game so that you can go home to your family and friends when the fires are over.

While part of a Type 1 Strike Team in Shasta County, CA, we were assigned to handline construction on a slopover. After having completed approximately 2/3 of a mile of handline, we were in need of a few helicopter bucket drops to cool the burning brush in front of us so we could proceed. The fire was a backing fire, burning through the brush and timber litter. We received support from two helicopters. After each bucket drop, the fire would flare up where the downdrafts were the most severe. After the fourth drop, the open line experienced a rapid flare up with approximately 10 foot flame lengths that pushed over the line. The first 7 members at the head of the line retreated back up the line in a hasty fashion. Everyone else was at the top of the ridge and away from danger. No one was hurt, just a little shaken.

LESSONS LEARNED:
Always post a lookout. The erratic fire behavior was noticed and communicated multiple times to the remaining crew based on observations. Never underestimate the power of the downdrafts from helicopter operations. I thought that the copter was too high to have that much of an impact. I was wrong. Ensure escape routes are identified and known. Our retreat was back up the line we cut, but a congestion of personnel occurred when the information to retreat wasn't passed on down the line. Ensure all PPE is on and in place. Multiple personnel didn’t have their helmet shrouds on due to the heat of the day. Luckily no one was hurt.

On May 30th our engine company was sent to a reported tree fire. Arriving on scene we found about 1/8 of an acre of eucalyptus trees on fire. We did a quick knock down. Then as we were mopping up I was moving around the edge of the fire when I fell into a 3' deep hole. The duff in this are was about a foot deep and littered with palm tree frawns. This hole had been covered with these frawns. Luckily I did not sustain any ijuries nor were there any objects in this pit making it similar to a dangerous animal trap. LESSONS LEARNED: Just because the ground appears to be normal you never know what is covering some hidden danger.

Attached is a video link and PDF report on a Wildland Shelter Report.

See attached PDF Document for Wildland Burnover Report

I was a helitack crewleader with the NCFS we had flow to a fire in a very high-class neighborhood on top of a mountain the fire conditions that day were severe with tornado warnings being called for that evening after making our way up the mountain and checking in with the IC it was determrned that a regular crew would handle putting in the line and we would be released to return to our landing zone we were loaded up in POVs and started the trip back down the mountain halfway down we were orderded to return to the top to assist the handcrew because the IC was worried about getting the volunteers off the fire we were give orders to construct our line right on the fires edge with active fire inside the line and the wind picking up we were assisted by a spotter plane and our 205 helicopter making water drops a dozer attempted to construct a dozer line but the IC decided that since this was a (Expensive neighborhood)that he would risk just handlines as not to disturb the landscape as we proceded downhill constructing line we lost our air support because the helo had to refuel we were told not to worry that there was a lookout in place a few minutes later we noticed a large amount of smoke below us and called the IC by radio and asked him what was going on below us the spotter plane advised that he could not see due to the smoke and that we should continue building line the IC advised that everything was fine and to keep going about five minutes later we were hit with a large spot fire that was building speed and intensity as it made an uphill run straight at us myself and the other crewleader ordered our crews into the black for safety when the IC ordered us to catch the fire! at this time i was informed we had injuries in the crew and that one of my crewmen had been burned we called a wounded firefighter alert and continued through the black to the bottom of the mountain to meet with EMS. LESSONS LEARNED: During severe fire conditions do not let someone talk you into doing somethig dangerous just to save some trees also post a lookout of your own when working in dangerous conditions if it dont feel right stop and give it a second look most of the time your gut is right and last even if the IC has years of experence you still have the right to say no for safety reasons and shoud use that right

Brevard County Fire Rescue Station's 22 & 21 were working a brushfire pushed by 20 mph winds. A 3 person brush unit were working along a high voltage powerline right of way to ensure that the fire didn't spot over the right-of-way. Several of the pine trees near the power lines started to flare. Most of the vegitation in central and south Florida has an oil base due to the tropical nature of the environment. The put off by this vegitation is thick and full of carbon. The smoke caused a conduction between the power lines. This hazard has been taught in our wildland classes and we have all heard of this hazard. What makes this different is we have it on video! The Florida Power and Light representative advised that had this arc gone to ground, like it normally does, it could have kill the 3 personnel on the ground. The Lieutenant at the front of the brush (not visible in the video) was pushed to the ground by the concussion of the smoke detonation. LESSONS LEARNED: Stay clear of high voltation powerlines during brushfires.