18:17 hours, 06/21/09, Pearland VFD dispatched for a structure fire at 5001 W. Plum. EMS Supervisor first on scene, confirmed a working attic fire with exposures. Brookside Village and Houston requested for mutual aid. An exterior attack was conducted for about ten minutes before another crew arrived. Fire was knocked down in the attic, then a PPV set up at the front door. Command noticed the roof in the D-sector was beginning to sag, and then conditions deteriorated rapidly. The fan was shut off, but the fire began blowing out the D-sector gable and through the roof were it had been sagging. After a couple minutes of hitting the fire both from the interior and exterior, Command called for Interior to back out and go defensive. Interior advised they were making good headway on the fire and stayed in the attic. The deck gun on Engine 11 was put into operation to help knock the fire down. Fortunately nobody was injured.
 
Things to remember:
1) PPV does not always produce the desired effect.
2) COMMAND is in charge. Don't let Interior tell you what to do. As the IC, YOU tell them what to do. They can't see the big picture like you can from the outside.
3) Think carefully before deciding to mix offensive and defensive operations.

The hood was worn by a Lt during a recent house fire in which there was a backdraft in the ceiling/duct work. Due to proper PPE the Lt. sustained a minor burn to his ear.

Photos Courtesy of Vinnie Costa

On Sunday February 15 at around 1700 (units from the Riverdale area, E813, E807, E830, E809, TK828, TK801, TK855, BC804) Truck 1 was dispatched as 2nd due truck to a report of a house fire in the area of Beacon Pl and 67th Av (Co13's area)  units arrives on scene @ 5805 67th Av with fire showing from the rear of a 2 story SFD.  Truck 1 w/ 7 personnel split crews providing ground ladders, roof operations and primary searches of the 2nd floor, while on the 2nd floor a water supply problem was encountered causing the 2nd floor to rapidly become engulfed in flames which resulted in 2 F/F exiting via the stairs and 2 F/F exiting via a 2nd story window to the roof.  One F/F from Truck 1 received minor burns to his shoulders and back, he was taken to MedStar where he was treated and released, the injured F/F is doing well and will return to duty by week’s end.  The F/F was wearing Globe Extreme Gear which held up well and prevented serious injuries. Truck 1 also assisted Fire Investigations and completed overhaul returning to service around 2030.

A working house fire became the scene of a close call with reported firefighters trapped Thursday afternoon in Southeast Guilford County when the Mt. Hope Fire Department was called to the fire less than a 1/2 mile from their station. The initial fire attack crew fought to keep the fire contained to the second story portion of the split level house, however just as this crew began to run low on air a major collapse occurred in the area in which they were operating. After repeated radio calls to the fire attack crew went unanswered, the RIT deployed in an attempt to locate and remove the downed firefighters, following the hoseline approximately 10-15 feet into the structure when suddenly conditions began to rapidly deteriorate. The RIT recognized that the environment was becoming untenable, and began exiting the structure. Within seconds, a much more significant collapse occurred. Fortunately, two of the RIT members managed to exit the structure just as the collapse overtook them, and the third member ended up within a few feet of the door under light debris. Firefighters standing outside along with the what was left of the original RIT made quick work of removing the last firefighter from the structure as the evacuation signal was sounded. Several desperate moments passed as everybody on scene assumed the worst for the unaccounted for fire attack crew. Providentially the crew in question had managed to exit the rear of the structure literally walking out over the collapse debris, however a communication breakdown prevented the crew from expediently notifying command of their location or well-being. Most importantly, no one was hurt, and all firefighters involved were briefly evaluated by EMS before rotating back into other assignments.

LESSONS LEARNED:

There are a couple of huge lessons to take away from this incident concerning lightweight construction and reading smoke. The two-story portion of the house was built in 1989 and throughout the events of the day would withstand a relatively great amount of fire involvement. However the single-story addition to the house had been added in the year 2000, and the difference in the characteristics in how these two structures withstood fire conditions was extraordinary to say the least. This despite only the difference of one decade between the time they were built. Crews arrived on scene to find heavy turbulent smoke pushing out of the windows of the second floor on the 'B' side of the structure, indicating a well involved but localized fire. The roof area of the single story portion of the house showed no indications of either heat or smoke, leading crews to assume that the fire was contained to the second story of the older part of the house. However the single story portion of the house would be the area that collapsed suddenly and unexpectedly. During the investigation it was discovered that during the renovation a large opening was left where the two structures joined, allowing unseen fire to moved throughout the attic area of the single story portion of the structure. Regardless, the lack of any signs of fire involvement in the single story attic prior to its abrupt failure are disconcerting to say the least. Other key issues brought to light from this incident are the importance of accurate accountability from the onset of an event as well as the need for proper and concise radio traffic throughout the incident. Fortunately there were no injuries in this near miss, as the IC poignantly made note of as he radioed communications that all units had cleared the scene late that evening. Breaking normal radio protocol he simply added to the message; "And everybody is going home safe." I don't think anybody will get onto him too much for that.

We were operating at a house fire where we were directed by Command to open the garage door. The fire was knocked down and we knew, being the first attack crew into the structure, that we had direct and safe access to the interior of the garage. We entered the garage and began to force the door by manipulating the mechanism and lifting on the door. As my crew leaned in to lift on the door, a saw blade came plunging through the aluminum, approximately twelve inches from a firefighters head. Sparks were flying and the blade quickly moved down the door toward the firefighter. I yelled and another firefighter grabbed him out of the way. We exited the garage and notified the Command of the situation. It seems the Operations Chief had tasked a crew to breach the garage door from the outside while the Incident Commander tasked my crew to open it from the inside.

Lessons Learned: Incident Commanders should leave tactical decision making to the assigned Operations Chief. Personnel should be assigned to tasks by one person to prevent duplication of effort and possibly dangerous, conflicting actions.

This close call happened to a fellow firefighter on April 20th. We were working a structure fire where the fire was set on the rear decking. Since the fire was contained to the rear of the house we made the attack from the rear. As we went up the steps to enter the house the deck gave way and one firefighter fell through. He had a minor knee injury but was cleared to work the next day.

Lessons Learned: Sound the floor in front of you even if it is visibly there.

Travis County Fire Rescue ESD#11. 05/11/2009 12:41:00 AM, C-Shift responds to a fully involved commercial garage fire. As 2 Engine-1102 firefighters stretch lines around the Delta side. The first firefighter advances as the second falls back to feed more hose around the corner. The first firefighter falls into a 7'-8' foot hole filled with water wearing full bunker gear. The firefighter held onto the hose, keeping his head above the water. After several attempts to self extricate, the second firefighter discovers the fallen firefighter and reports the incident to the Lieutenant. The second firefighter attempts to assist the fallen firefighter, but the ground was too soft. To avoid another incident, they retrieve an attic ladder, drop it into the hole, and assist the firefighter to safety. A report was given to all units on scene as the discovery of the hole was made.

Lessons Learned: Avoid any suspicious ground shadows or puddles of water if the depth or fall potential has not been identified.

In late 2004 I was at a structure fire, my unit was first on scene after making my scene size up and waiting for additional units to arrive me & my crew entered from the bravo side of the structure, we started a right hand search into what I thought was a hallway leading to the main fire room, smoke conditions were heavy, we weren’t but 10 or so feet inside, when I felt the floor drop out from underneath my hands, I tumbled 15 or 20 ft. headfirst into the basement after I became oriented again, I quickly crawled back up the stairs due to the fact that the fire was actually in the basement and had spread to the first floor, as i made my exit up I met my partner half way down the stairs, we both exited the structure and I was treated by ems for a sprang right shoulder. Due to the age of the house I didn’t realize there was even a basement there, or that there wasn't a door to close off said basement the house was over 100 yrs. of age.

Lesson Learned: 1st arriving units should always take a long hard look at the structure that they are about to enter because depending on what side you enter from there may be an open basement for you to go head first into be aware hazards are everywhere.

Yesterday, while responding to a working dwelling fire, a Firefighter from the Lynbrook (Long Island, NY) FD fell out of a responding apparatus. The Firefighter suffered some fractures and lost consciousness and is still in the hospital, but is expected to recover.

We were first in to arson house fire.  We put out fire and started hydraulic ventilation, which in turn drew a spark into some un-ignited accelerant behind us. The fire behind filled the whole first floor instantly. We started to fight fire toward the door to get out, when our hose line burned through. We had fire all around us with very low visibility and decided to exit the same way we came in. I went out the door and my partner bailed out the window.

Lessons Learned: Put priority on a backup line, even at a routine house fire. Arson fires may have accelerants that have not yet ignited and my ignite after you are in the building.

We responded to a car fire at scene of non-injury MVA this afternoon. Engine compartment on a 2000 Nissan Maxima was fully involved. The hood was crumpled up from the force of the original MVA, and fire was venting freely from the sides of the hood.
 
As my FF was stretching the line and my Captain was walking up to get the halligan (I was at the panel preparing to charge the line) we heard what sounded like a pistol firing. We all ducked, then quickly realized we were uninjured, and resumed our work. The fire was knocked down quickly, and on the ground adjacent to the front tire we found the remains of the hood strut. That was the source of the bang we heard as we were setting up.
 
It bounced off the crumpled hood and landed harmlessly on the ground. This was, in my opinion, a good reminder that things turn bad quickly, and we should all maintain a heightened situational awareness while operating at scenes.

...

Dispatched for reported basement fire, 2 story residential structure. Arrived on scene with smoke visible from Side C and through the open front door.  360 of structure revealed visible fire through a basement window and no exterior door to the basement.

Picture 1-living room immediately above the fire room
Picture 2-floor joists
Picture 3-Exterior damage, view of window to the fire room

I thought these photos would be another good example of construction hazards and the need to consider time on scene and fire progression.  With what appeared to be an intact floor in the living room, an experienced crew searching the first floor recognized the hazard (soft floor) and worsening conditions as well as the Division C officer; both notified the IC and evacuated the structure. 

No injuries.

We responded to a residential structure fire at 0230hrs on April 1st, 2009. It was reported that there was a fire in the basement. I was the company officer on the first due engine (2401). Upon our arrival, there was very light smoke showing from the garage area of a two story residential structure with a basement. The residents opened the overhead garage door upon evacuation of the house. I made contact with the homeowner to ensure all occupants were accounted for and he informed they were with the exception of one cat. I made a 360 of the structure and observed heavy smoke in the basement with smoke on the ground floor becoming heavier. My firefighter was deploying an 1 3/4" attack line and he and I met up at the front of the garage. We made entry into the structure through the garage door to the house. Smoke was now about 2-3ft off the floor. I searched the room directly adjacent to the basement stairs and then we proceeded towards the kitchen area. By this time the smoke was to the floor but very little heat. We crawled towards the kitchen in an attempt to locate the basement stairs. I was sounding the floor while we proceeded through the structure and upon entering the kitchen the floor suddenly weakened and was very spongy. I felt heat through my gloves and my firefighter gave me the TIC that he had brought. I scanned the area where the floor was weak and notice a heavy amount of heat. The basement stairs were located and we attempted to descend into the basement to stop the fire before it broke through the floor. I again proceeded cautiously sounding the stairs, we got about ¼” down the stairs when it felt as if they were weakened as well. I instructed my firefighter to back out of the structure. I informed command of the situation and stated that we were going to attack from a basement window. By this time the fire had extended through the first floor and upon our attack from the basement window, the first floor experienced flashover and became well involved. We were able to re-position our attack line and make a successful attack from the front door of the house and the fire was knocked down without firefighters making entry into the structure. After the fire was extinguished and overhauled, it was determined that the fire had extended to the second floor through air vents. The fire originated in the basement and had burned through six (6) floor joists before it burned through the floor on the ground level. We expect that the fire had extended to the ground floor about the time we started to make an attack through the basement window. There were no injuries to any civilians or firefighters.

Lessons Learned: This fire presented a unique situation in that it was a very deep seated fire and hard to locate. The fire was in an area that was inaccessible to firefighters due to the structural instability of the ground floor. We learned that you must always sound the floor when entering a structure no matter where you think the fire is located because it could have originated in a different area that may have already weakened the structure prior to your arrival. Training is another major component to this fire, my senior firefighter and I used our training and I believe that kept us from getting into trouble and possibly falling through the floor into a well involved basement. Finally a good solid command presence is essential, the officer in command made his actions clear to all units operating on the fire ground and communicated the condition reports from the attack crew to everyone on scene.

On the evening of January 6, 2009 the City of Milton, Florida fire department was dispatched to a major structure fire. Three hours into the call, I was assigned the task of changing and replenishing air bottles. The air trucks were lined up in the street adjacent to the fire scene, with vehicles parked on either side of the air trucks. An off duty Battalion Chief from a nearby county who was a spectator was leaving a parking spot (he had someone directing him out of the parking spot) close to the air truck. I saw that he had a spotter so I continued filling bottles, I heard a firefighter behind me and someone else yell stop. I looked down towards the Battalion Chief’s pick up to see his front tire drive over an air bottle. The air bottle became a projectile which passed within inches of myself and at least three other firefighters in the immediate area and travelled approximately 50 feet before coming to a rest. The Battalion Chief continued on his way never stopping to see what damage he caused or if anyone was hurt.  The incident was reported to command. We were lucky, no one was injured, and damage to the bottle appears to be confined to the valve.

Lessons learned:
Pay attention to your surroundings.
Battalion Chiefs and their spotters can make mistakes