A Firefighter on the roof of an apartment building fire was assisting the ladder company making a trench cut fell through the roof. He was acting as the guide for the sawman and his knee went through then his lower body, He caught himself and was pulled to safety by his lieutenant. The roof had very little pitch and was to long for a roof ladder.

LESSONS LEARNED: Crew integrity is paramount in roof operations, ensuring the sawman has a guideman and an officer to act as safety officer I believe saved this firefighters life he fell through the roof into heavy fire in the common attic area.

After having the power company disconnect the electricity to a 43 unit apartment complex that destroyed two-thirds of the building a tower ladder with two firefighters came in contact with a primary on the C side of the building and it arced against the boom.

LESSONS LEARNED: We took for granted that the actual lines had been disconnected from the grid when in actuallity the had shut the power off to the building from the pole and not the primary line that ran adjacent to it. Lesson learned make sure tell the power company exactly what you want done and verify that it was completed.

Our department was working at a one story house fire in subzero temps and there were many slips and falls, including one from the roof .

LESSONS LEARNED:

Command , battalion chiefs should carry ice melt in the command units and assign the saftey officer to use ice melt . They should require all personnel on the roof to work on roof ladders and not to step off to "get it done".

A southwestern Arkansas fire chief is hospitalized in stable condition after suffering smoke inhalation while fighting a house fire.

Horatio Chief Bruce Richardson was treated at the scene of the fire Monday afternoon before being flown by helicopter to a Texarkana hospital. No other injuries are reported.

Fire Department secretary Reita Lofland says Richardson was not wearing a breathing apparatus and was having trouble breathing.

Lofland says the home is a total loss and the cause of the fire is under investigation.

Horatio is in Sevier County about 10 miles south of De Queen.
 

On Friday, January 15, first arriving units to a fully-involved structure fire (doublewide with add-ons) were met with the unmistakable sounds of ammunition being cooked off in the structure about 50' from their engine. Based on these conditions, the crews decided upon a defensive operation, using the truck mounted deck gun to quickly cool the corner of the structure where the ammunition was located. After just a few minutes on scene, one of the pump operators felt that he had been struck on the back by a projectile, a quick check noted no visible injury, and he quickly returned to pump operations; however, damage was noted to the outer shell of his bunker coat.

A post incident review, and an inspection of the pump operator’s gear, revealed a projectile had penetrated his coat’s outer shell, skimmed across the vapor barrier and exited the outer shell a few inches lateral of the first penetration. After leaving the coat, the projectile then struck the engine causing damage. The pump operator was standing next to the engine, facing the rear of the truck, this angle allow the projectile to pass through his gear and then hit the apparatus. It is now obvious, that if the operator had been facing towards, or away from the apparatus, the projectile would have most likely entered his body.

A couple of days after this incident, as another member of the first arriving engine was inspecting his gear, he also noticed that his coat had been penetrated with an entrance and exit hole under the arm area. He felt that this most likely occurred while he was on top of the engine, for a couple of minutes, setting the direction of the deck gun. Therefore, there were actually two close calls of a similar nature on this single incident.

Some of the important lessons learned or reinforced on this incident, is that wearing your gear can make a difference in more ways than it was designed. Even in defensive operations there can be many unanticipated risks, and the “hot zone” can quickly change at an incident. Spending a little extra and buying gear that will protect you from more than just the "minimum requirements", is not a bad idea. Engineers and others not involved in (active) firefighting need to be in gear, and are not exempt from the hazards of the job.

Attached you will find a PDF file of a CLOSE CALL in Clearwater, FL from Dec. 2009 - here is a description of the Close Call.

On December 28, 2009 at 1146 hours Clearwater Fire Rescue was dispatched to a dryer on fire inside a house. The initial response was three engines, one ladder truck, one ALS rescue, one squad (heavy rescue), one paramedic lieutenant (LR49) and a district chief. At 1149 hours District 45 (D45) reported to dispatch and responding units a large column of smoke in the area. D45 gives initial size up as 1 ½ story residential structure with large volume of fire with explosions. D45 located closest water supply and ordered dispatch to activate the working fire file and at 1150 hours assumed, “Clearwater Command”. The working fire file dispatched an additional engine, truck, ALS fire rescue, Sunstar ambulance, power company and notifies via pager a fire inspector and administrative chiefs. A water supply was established and two 1 ¾ “attack lines were deployed. E45 positioned one line on the Alpha side and E51 positioned the second line on the Bravo side. Command assigned the third due engine (E47) as rapid intervention team (RIT). E51 was cautioned by command to be aware E45 was making their way in on the alpha side. Command ordered first due truck (T45) to team up with Squad 49 (S49) for primary search and reported the possibility of an elderly female inside. S49 located the stairs to the second floor on the delta side and reported to command “heavy fire”. Command requested E51 to position their hose line to protect S49 search crew. E51 was on the opposite side of the structure. E51 attempted to locate S49 via radio received no response. Command then attempted to establish E45s position as interior. Division Chief of Operations (CL600) radioed command he had repositioned E45 to the delta side to back up S49. E44 radioed it had established a secondary water supply. Command ordered second due truck (T48) to assist T45 x-ray (outside team) with vent enter search (VES) second floor. Command ordered E44 to tag up with E47 for (RIT) (now six personnel) because crews are working on two floors. Special Operations Chief (CL 610) radioed to command he has S49 and E45 operating on the second floor. T45 x-ray radioed command they were exiting the second floor. Command attempts to confirm an all clear of victims and receives no response due to radio traffic between CL610 and CL 600. CL610 reported to CL600 they are pulling the ceiling and have fire over their heads. CL600 responded back to CL610, “That back part of the house is getting ready to light off, Kent,” Got to get a line in there.” Interior crew requested ventilation of the second floor windows. T48 radioed to command that there were way too many people on the second floor.T48 asked command for confirmation that primary search is complete and second floor is all clear. Command confirmed all clear and reassigned T48 to first floor for overhaul. At the twenty minute notification from dispatch, command assigned Training Chief (CL 300) safety. T48 radioed to CL610 to determine the number of companies on the second floor. Part of CL 610 response to T48s question is inaudible but stated due to lathe and plaster walls and ceilings they were having trouble getting through. T48 notified CL610 he and his crew were coming back to the second floor to assist. S49 Lieutenant radioed to command he was exiting structure low on air and had a missing member. CL610 radioed command he had S49’s missing member with him. T45 radioed command they needed a hose line to the delta side. Command asked CL600 to take care T45s request. No response from CL600. Twenty two minutes after arrival, command asked all units to stand by for a personnel accountability report (PAR). Command radioed to CL600 that no one was in the house per the home owner. CL600 responded to command,” OK, let’s rethink how we’re doing this then.” CL610 radioed a request to command for a status report on smoke conditions from the outside. Command acknowledged. At 1216 hours command requested dispatch for the emergency retreat tone and that all crews exit the structure for a defensive attack. A second (PAR) was initiated by Command. At 1218 the second (PAR) was completed. At 1220 hours CL600 radioed command, “We’re going to send T48 with CL610 back up to the second floor and I’m going to have E44, who’s on the rear, to keep that bottom room in check with all that junk in it, that’s where most of the smoke is now second floor, copy?”Command wanted confirmation of what crews and what floor interior and also confirmed E44 at rear entrance on Charlie side. CL600 confirmed CL610 and T48 on second floor and E44 position. Command radioed to CL600 he had a report from an investigator there were oxygen bottles inside the structure so there may be a few that have not exploded yet. CL600 responded, “I copy that.” CL600 radioed to CL610 for a situation report.CL610 responded they are looking for the base of the fire. CL600 notified CL610 he had” balloon frame smoke “showing from the second floor. CL610 requested a progress report from command on smoke conditions from the outside. Command had CL600 respond from his vantage point. CL600 responded to CL610 that he was unsure of the type of construction he had on the second floor, smoke was coming out of everywhere as usual and that was taking care of the first floor, too. Dispatch gave forty minute notification. Command ordered CL610 off second floor because he didn’t feel comfortable with interior operations, “We’ll do this from the exterior.” CL600 ordered D48 to protect CL610’s retreat from the second floor. Command requested CL600 to the street for a face to face. CL600 responded he will meet up after crews are out safe and he agreed with commands change of plan. Command reaffirmed he did not want anybody inside the building anymore. CL600 radioed to CL610 with urgency, “I need you out of there right now, 610 now.” CL610 responded,”OK, we’re coming.” CL600 to CL610, “I need you outside right now.” T48 attempted a radio transmission, but was cut off. T48 with urgency radioed command, “Can you get somebody up here we’re lost.” Safety (CL300) radioed command he’s sending T45 in on the delta side,” to get 610 out of there.” T48 transmitted a mayday to command. CL300 responded,”T48, go ahead with your mayday.” T48 advised he and his crew are on the second floor and they couldn’t find their way out. (An audible low air alarm could be heard through T48’s radio transmission). CL300 advised T48 crew to go to the delta side windows; T45’s crew was coming to get them. T48 advised CL300 he can’t find his way. CL300 responded,”Alright, they’re coming in to get you.” Command requested a second alarm through dispatch. CL300 radioed to CL610 to try to make it to the delta side, T45 was coming to get them. CL610’s response was inaudible. S49s two person crew returned to the delta side after changing out air cylinders. Due to the fact S49s crew performed the primary search of the second floor they were familiar with the floor plan. S49s lieutenant and firefighter entered the delta side. There was heavy fire involvement of the open interior stair area. When S49s lieutenant reached the second floor hallway he located the first member involved in the mayday. S49s lieutenant was able to guide each of the four members involved in the mayday to his firefighter on the stairs. S49s firefighter then guided the members out the delta side door to safety. During the rescue D48 radioed to command with extreme urgency, (first part of transmission was inaudible), believed he had a missing member and, “I need another line to the delta side, now!” Command ordered E51 to the delta side upstairs to assist T48. T48 canceled the mayday, all personnel was accounted for. Command asked for confirmation on T48 crew and CL610. D48 confirmed all personnel out safe. Command ordered all personnel out to the street a. s. a .p..Command reaffirmed again that this is a defensive attack and nobody was to be inside, had dispatch activate the emergency retreat tone, and then called for a (PAR). When (PAR} was completed, command again stated defensive attack only.

Last week one of our firefighters was in the attic with another mutual aid member after the fire had been mostly knocked down. The firegighter who was injured at the time was getting low on air and told his partner that they needed to leave. At that time the partner firefighter commented to the injured firefighter about the poor condition of the roof above them and how it looked close to failure, so they should not come back up. Just then, a large piece of 10" x 10" roof system seperated and fell, landing on the injured firefighters back, hitting his air pack. A mayday was subsequently called by his partner and rescue was initated quickly and very successfully. The injured firefighter walked himself out to the ambulance and was taken to the hospital for evaluation. He had recieved some injury to the muscles and tendons in his back and will have to miss work for a few days. However, if his air pack had not broken the fall of the piece of large timber beam and prevented direct contact with the firefighter the results could have been much worse.

LESSONS LEARNED: Using the proper PPE can often times can prevent an injury from being much worse. Another lesson would be that staying in close contact with your partner firefighter and having radio contact with command can hasten the response to a firefighter emergency and having a well prepared FAST or RIT team ready to respond can prevent more tragic consequences. The other lesson could be that constantly mointoring and evaluating the changing conditions of a fire building and it\'s structural components, even after the majority of the fire is knocked down is essential for firefighter safety.

On Friday, January 15, my units arrived on a fully involved structure fire (doublewide with add-ons) and crews began defensive operations. They were met with the unmistakable sounds of amunition being cooked off in the structure about 100' from the engine. After a few minutes on scene, as crews directed the truck mounted deck gun toward the area of the explosions, one of my pump operations came to me turned his back to me and asked if he was bleeding, that he had been hit (by bullets). While he was not bleeding, and was able to continue operations, investigation revealed that two pieces of shrpnel penatrated his coats outer shell and vapor barrier, and were stopped in the liner. Also, a bullit hit the engine about two feet from where he was standing at the pump, cauding damage (obviously a round that was in a weapon). No injuries were sustained by any of the personnel.

LESSONS LEARNED:

Wearing your gear makes a difference in more ways than it was designed. Spend a little extra, and buy gear that will protect you from more than just the "minimum requirements". We are sure glad that we did. Engineers, and others not involved in (active) firefighting need to be in gear.

These photos are an interesting view of our furniture warehouse fire last
month. Despite the small portion that collapsed, most of the roof structure
'drooped' rather than failing all at once. Granted, there was no other load
than the roof itself (no fireman were on the roof), but it was interesting
to see that it didn't completely fall in except for the one spot.
 

These are pictures from the 2nd alarm fire in Bellows Falls the other night. The owner had built in a crude dumb waiter type device to bring books up and down the cellar stairs. After you opened the cellar door, there was just this shaft. Luckily no firefighters fell through into the basement. The cellar was packed with books making overhaul a pleasant job. They had a cellar fire due to books being stacked too close to the woodstove. Be careful out there. You never know what you will find.

On 12/18 while operating at a dwelling fire, my foot fell through the roof. Units were operating in and on the exposure dwelling of a fire in a two story duplex type house. I was on the 1.5 story roof of the exposure dwellings sunroom. I walked in toward the dwelling to get a hoseline from the interior crew and extinguish some fire on the outside. While walking, I stepped on a soft spot on the roof with one foot falling through into the sunroom below. I was saved from completely falling by where i was walking, as there was a minimally burned joist between my feet. Fortunately I was just momentarily shook up fromt he near miss and no injuries were sustained.

LESSONS LEARNED:

Bring a tool and sound the roof always be weary of roofs even on a exposure away from the fire origin area. walk on joists if absolutely necesary to walk on roof.

We were dispatched for a structure fire at a 2 story apartment building. We were 3rd in, and saw thick black smoke rolling from the roof. Turns out there was a tar pot on fire. The roof gets laddered, and we go up to find the other crews working on the fire. Fire is out soon after. Crews then applied water to the outside of the tar pot to cool it down. The close call comes in when our engine was asked to open the tar pot. So, I start walking toward the pot when the driver who was with me says "put your mask on". I said \"why, the fire is out\". He reiterated again to "put my mask on". I thought it was unnecessary, but, I have about 2 years on at the time, and the driver had about 15 years, so I listened. We mask up, go behind the pot, and open it. At that moment, for some reason, the stream was directed straight into the tar pot. Before I knew it, we were both covered in hot tar. Bunker gear, pack, helmet, and MASK were hit. Had I not been wearing the mask, that I was told to put on, half of my face would have been severely burned.

LESSONS LEARNED:

1. Don't be complacent. Just because the "fire's out", doesn"t mean nothing could happen.

2. Listen to the "vets". You may think you know it all, but these guys (generally) have great knowledge and insight on things that, you, just have not experienced.

December 18 the City was busy with nearly 10 inches of snow at 2320 hours Q-1, Q-11, Q-8, Q-5, Q-6, R-1, Safety 2 and BC-1 were dispatched to the 500 block of N. 33rd Street for a reported house fire. BC-1 arrived on scene with heavy fire showing from Division 2 on the C side of a two story wood frame structure with fire spreading to the B and D exposure he immediately requested the 2nd alarm. Units did have some difficulty with responding to this incident due to weather conditions. Fire did spread to the B and D exposure. Units placed several 2 ½ in service to protect the exposures and the original fire structure. Units entered the house and begin fire attack. Chief 2 arrived on location and immediately did a 360 of the incident and discovered conditions on the C side had deteriorating conditions and immediately ordered the evacuation of the structure. Emergency communication activated the evacuation tones and units quickly departed the structure, within 60 seconds there was partial collapse of the roof. This truly was a near miss for our personnel. The fire was marked under control shortly after midnight. Units remained on scene assisting the fire investigators well into the morning. The fire is under investigation.

I was dispatched to a residential structure fire in my town. I was part of a medic crew consisting of three firefighter/paramedics. Our medic unit arrived to find a residential single family home with the second floor involved. My crew was assigned to vent one of the second floor windows. After we set a ladder in place underneath one of two windows I proceeded to climb to the top of the ladder to vent. My fellow firefighter healed the ladder as I settled in position. The ladder we used was a 14 foot roof ladder, because of the size of the ladder I was unable to hook my leg into the ladder for support. My tool off the medic was a 4 foot attic hook which I was using to vent. I managed to vent one of the two windows when I proceeded to vent the second window. As I struck the window my tool bounced off and forced by momentum back off the ladder. As I tried to catch myself I lost balance and fell to the ground. Somehow I managed to fall at least 10 to 12 feet to the ground and land on my feet. I bounced between the ladder and the front step to the house only managing to cut my finger and bruise my knee. After gathering myself and being checked on by fellow firefighters I insisted that I finish my job. I proceeded back up the ladder and finished venting the window.

LESSONS LEARNED

Besides walking away from this without any serious injury I learned some BIG lessons. One slow down and think twice before acting. Two make sure I use a ladder big enough for my situation. If I had a bigger ladder I would have been able to hook my leg in like I would have liked. Next is my tool. The tool I used was to small for the job. I feel if I was using a larger or heavier tool I would have not had the recoil that I had with the pike pole. I realize at a fire scene its tough to sit back and wait you have to act on your training. A fire is a hazardous scene and you try to stay as safe as possible, but bad things happen sometimes. I\'m just taking what happened as a learning fire and do my best to not let it happen again.

December 13, 2009
This is a report of an incident that I was involved in that could easily have resulted in multiple fire fighter deaths. As far as near misses go, this was very close. I had worked as a nozzleman out of one of our downtown fire stations for about a year. Sadly, my department had given me no training as a nozzleman and had no documented procedures on high-rise strategy and tactics. Each platoon performed their high-rise operations using their own unique methods. Since the incident there has been lots of talk, but little has been done to rectify the causes that created this situation. We did get an in-station computer course on elevators.
Immediately on arrival, FF F and I entered the lobby of __________________. The pump crew had already been to the alarm panel and was headed for the elevator when we joined them. The information that came over the radio was that the panel was showing an alarm on the 32nd floor. I entered the small North West elevator with Captain G, Nozzleman D, Fire Fighter F, Fire Fighter G, Probationary Fire Fighter J. As we ascended in the elevator word came over the radio from Lt. V, that a light on the panel was showing an alarm on the 19th floor as well. Captain G made the decision to check the 19th on the way up. When we exited the elevator on the 19th floor, we checked for any indication of trouble. The floor was free of smoke: This stop gave us an idea of the buildings floor plan. The six of us reentered the elevator and headed to the 32nd floor. When the elevator door opened on the 32nd floor, there was a blast of heat and dense black smoke instantly filled the elevator. A soon as the smoke filled the elevator, I could not see the other fire fighters standing next to me. Opening the elevator appeared to create a chimney effect. Fire Fighter F made several unsuccessful attempts to close the elevator door. It appeared that the elevator was in normal operation mode, which means that the door must fully open before it will close. All six fire fighters in the elevator dropped their hose packs, high-rise packs and helmets in an attempt to mask up. I managed to don the face piece but had considerable difficulty getting the regulator to dock with it. After taking several breaths of the seriously contaminated atmosphere, I called out that I was going to attempt to find the fire door to the hallway. My hope was to find clear enough air to finish docking my regulator. I made the assumption that each floor plan was similar and that the fire door to the hallway was on my left. Upon leaving the elevator, I immediately moved in that direction. I found the door and after a few seconds found the door handle and opened the door. Just inside the fire door a woman was standing in her doorway asking what was happening. I escorted her back in her apartment and asked her to remain inside until I returned. I docked my regulator and reentered the elevator lobby trying to find the rest of the fire crew. The elevator doors were closed. I attempted to open the doors but could not. I moved back into the hallway and found Capt. G, NM D, FF G. I still did not know where FF F and PFF J had gotten to. My concern was that they were still in the elevator and in trouble. It was at this time that I was told that they had gotten the elevator to the 31st floor and that they were running hose from the standpipe there to the 32nd floor. NM D was breaking glass in the house fire hose cabinet and he handed me the nozzle. The fire was knocked down quickly. Immediately after the fire was knocked down the door to the West stairwell was opened and the crew was re-united on the hallway side of the fire door. Pf J. and I did a quick overhaul. I meet with NM D in the hallway and we moved our crew to the roof for fresh air via the West stairwell. NM D showed me the ITX that he had turned on in the pump on the way to the call. The peak readings that I saw where: 1950 PPM CO and 13.5% O2. I discussed the readings with NM D and we reentered the stairwell to let Capt. G know that we where heading to the ground level to see EMS. We were transported to the hospital, spent some time on oxygen, got some blood work done and we were cleared for light duty by the doctor. West District Chief A gave us the rest of the shift and the last night shift off. Primary personal learning was that my training was completely inadequate and that our nonexistent SOP’s were also completely inadequate.
Additional Learning:
1: Improve fire code enforcement (elevator controls)
2: develop consistent protocols (any protocols)
3: stop a floor below (or 2)
4: ensure fire control of the elevator (if not, hump the stairs)
5: pre-connect regulator to the face piece 6: review radio communications volume controls and feedback benchmarks emergency situations (may days, accountability.) What surprised me most! The response of my administration. Sad really. I set up this chronology for use during the so called critique, and to help me understand how the time line played out. According to the communications logs, from the time we opened the elevator door to the time that overhaul was complete was 6 minutes.