Honolulu fire fighters close call with a communication room explosion On August 12, 2009, at 2217 hours, Honolulu Fire Department (HFD) units responded to an “odor of gas” in downtown Honolulu. Fire officials on scene contacted the local gas company requesting their assistance in detecting the presence and location of any gas leaks within the structure. Subsequent reports from the Gas Company (GASCO) informed the HFD’s Incident Commander (IC) that the building was not connected to local gas service. Matters were further complicated when pre-incident fire plans verified the absence of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) or synthetic natural gas (SNG) within the building and the lack of occupants who were knowledgeable or familiar with the building and its contents at that late hour. HFD crews began a systematic check of the building in an attempt to locate portable sources of gas. Leads produced no source for the odor. In one area where the odor was detected, HFD personnel considered a methanol-powered vehicle as a potential source. At approximately 0045 hours, the vehicle was removed from its location and HFD crews returned to their apparatuses when an explosion occurred in the building. The explosion tore off the door leading to a communication room on the second floor of the 16-story Hawaii State Office building and sent it flying more than 20 feet from its original location. Scattered debris damaged several adjacent doors and walls throughout the area outside the communication room and also left a cooling unit lodged in a window. Fortunately no one was injured, but two minutes earlier, HFD crews had been in close proximity to the area where the blast occurred. Had personnel not removed the vehicle from its stall when they did, there may have been a tragic outcome. After the explosion, a quick personnel accountability report (PAR) was conducted and all HFD personnel were accounted for. Fire units then extended their investigation to the communication room where the explosion had occurred. High concentrations of SNG were detected coming from a conduit containing fiber optic cables. Earlier test readings around this same room failed to detect any significant gas readings. As a result, the locked communications room was not accessed or investigated. GASCO was notified of the events and a crew was sent to the scene to look for a leak in their lines. It was determined later that SNG from an underground 4-inch line was leaking and the synthetic lighter-than-air product had somehow found its way into the conduit which ran into the communications room. After consulting with the electric and gas companies, power to the area’s entire grid system was shut down. Governor Linda Lingle was out of town, but her residence at the historic Washington Place was affected by the shut down, as some 50 other businesses in the area. Honolulu Police closed streets and redirected traffic while GASCO personnel completed an initial patch of the leaking pipe. At around 1230 hours, some 14 hours after the initial dispatch, streets were reopened and power was restored to the area. GASCO work crews returned the following day to make final repairs.

Lessons Learned:

Although a systematic risk assessment of this scene was conducted by the IC, first-arriving companies to this scene, and both of the Department’s Hazardous Materials Response Teams, this incident shows us that even when we believe we have eliminated all variables and all potential risks identified on our incident action plan (IAP) we should continue to monitor the situation for safety. A revisit of our IAP might be considered to ensure that we have not overlooked any aspect during the preliminary investigation of the scene. During a preliminary post-incident analysis with the first on-scene companies, the IC for this response recapped his thought process and his IAP with his personnel. He reiterated the fact that at any time, if he himself or anyone at the scene determined there were any signs of impending danger, all units would have been alerted and removed from the immediate area of the scene. Speaking emphatically to the two probationary fire fighters who were present in this group, he also reiterated the fact that each individual should not hesitate to notify their superiors of any observation that has the potential to be unsafe. All members present said they will approach any subsequent response to an “odor of gas” with an entirely different set of eyes. The bottom line here is that a systematic approach to any situation is essential; and even when it is applied correctly, there are always variables that may not have been uncovered during the initial size-up. Although safety at the scene is the responsibility of the IC or his/her designee, ultimately, it is the responsibility of everyone who has responded to the scene.

Last night the fire department was dispatched for an anhydrous leak. The leak from the best of my knowledge was from a hose between the farmers tractor and the applicator tank. First arriving units with the COMMANDING OFFICER decided to drive thought the plume of anhydrous ammonia. Once beyond the point of no return they lost all visibility as well as the ability to breathe normally being in an IDLH environment. According to a friend of mine on the department not on the call they became disoriented with the chief officer (also the FEO) freaking out unable to go backwards or forwards and eventually putting the apparatus in the ditch. (F-450 rescue truck) All of the members bailed out with some finding fresh air easier than others with some having SCBA's and reportedly two members sharing a mask. To my understanding 5 members of the FD were transported to the Hospital all treated and released. The following is the news report. Hazmat team responds to anhydrous spill Posted: May 6, 2008 07:13 AM CDT From KWWL.COM An anhydrous spill forced a road in Dubuque County to close. Just before 10:00 Monday night, Dubuque County Hazmat was called to 5202 Karper Harbor Road in rural Cascade. Charles Knepper was attempting to apply anhydrous to a field when it spilled. Area homes were evacuated. A few members of the Cascade Fire Department were exposed to the anhydrous. They were treated at a hospital and released. Karper Harbor Road was re-opened Tuesday morning.

Responded to a multiple vehicle crash as a Paramedic for a Private Ambulance Service. Upon arrival the Engine crew was actively do vehicle extrication using their combi tool. Only one Engine was dispatched and no additional resources were requested. My partner went to the car that the firefighters were working on and I went to the other two cars to check on possible injuries. Finding only minor injuries I proceded to the drivers side of the extrication vehicle and opened the door. I observed the motor was running so I reached in to turn off the ignition, the engine shut off but the key would not turn completely off. The vehicle was in Drive and the elderly driver had her foot on the brake. LESSONS LEARNED: Extrication starts with proper vehicle stabilization and vehicle safety. If this elderly driver would have taken her foot off the brake, who knows how many people would have gotten hurt. Proper vehicle extrication should also include the additional resources to handle all the functions at a motor vehicle crash.

FD Dispatched to a possible electrocution, two subjects, unconscious, in the basement, and Children calling it in. Upon Chief 372 arrival he met the children in the front yard who said their dad was in the basement and mom went down to help and she started shaking and went down. Chief 372 went to the basement door to find the basement had about 6 inches of water throughout. He could see both victims one face down and the other across the first victims legs partially in the water. The neighbor had a little electric tic and he said he put it in the water with no reading on it. The children said they went shopping and when they came home the father heard water spraying downstairs. When he went downstairs he opened a door and started shaking all over. The mother told the kids to call 911 and when she went to help she also passed out. While chief 372 was at the basement door above the water chief 372 could hear one of the victims trying to breath and gurgling in the water. As one of chief 372 other guys arrived we immediately pulled the electric meter from the front of the house (power company over 1 hour eta) this goes against our SOG's. crews then made entry into the basement where they had about 6 inches of sulfur water(normal for the area as most of the wells in the area are sulfur water). When crews checked the electric panel we had a blown breaker for the basement area this was done while the following treatments were going on. Crews turned the mother over and cleared her airway and started supplemental O2 via ambu bag. She still had a pulse and was trying to breath on her own. The father was pulseless and apneic. Crews started CPR on him and moved both victims from the basement to the upstairs kitchen area. Crews worked on both victims and they were transported by ambulance to the hospital. Crews did get a pulse back on the father but no resperations. He did start breathing on his own enroute to the hospital. Both mother and father survived the ordeal and are leading normal lives again. The Rest of the story… Chief 372 & crew get back to the station and the hospital calls - They need crews to go back out and investigate more because they can find no entry or exit wounds to indicate the electrocution. Lets just say at this point Crews went back out to see what they could find out. They felt it was a poisoning of some type not an electrocution. Chief 372 got the call from the hospital and went back to the scene with a couple guys to see what they could find. Since they said it appeared to be some kind of poisoning the took the gas meter with them. When they walked in the door we were hit with 75ppm of Hydrogen sulfide. (TLV is 10ppm IDLH is 300). They were back at the scene about 45 minutes after They cleared the scene the first time. They notified the hospital from the scene as to what they found. They then notified our health department as it did not seem right to them and had them respond. When they arrived they called the EPA out of Chicago. They sent a crew via plane to Metro airport and come to the scene. They were there in about 6 hours. The scene is about 30-45 minutes form the airport. In the mean time Chief 372 got a call from the station that one of the fireman at the station was complaining of Shortness of Breath and a couple of more complaining of dizziness. Chief 372 responded back to the station with the rescue and called for an ambulance. Since they are volunteer Chief 37 arrived at the same time that Chief 372 did. He advised C37 of the situation and what was going on. Chief 372 told him that the station was out of service and that all personnel on scene were going to be evaluated at the hospital. The ambulance arrived and transported three firemen and the Chief took the remainder in the Rescue unit. They were out of service for two hours while the health department waited on scene for the EPA. When the EPA arrived the FD was called back to be the stand by crew for the EPA entry team. We spent the next two days with them on scene. Here is what they found. The house has about two feet of plumbing in the house that feeds the barns for the horses. This is in a room about 4X9 that they use as a "tornado shelter". In the room is where the pump and the pressure tank is for the system. The family was gone for about 6 hours shopping so the FD do not know how long the leak was going. Upon investigation the EPA found that the pressure tank had a pinhole leak around one of the seams that had rusted. Under pressure it was creating an aerosal of hydrogen sulfide. FD do not know how long the leak was going but the fd figure it either overheated the system and tripped the breaker or the fd got about 24 inches of water trapped in the room and it popped the breaker when it got into the electrical. The FD thinks the second to explain the amount of water in the basement area along with the sump pump backing up do to no power. It was on the same breaker as the pump. During the investigation the EPA put a tent up around the pump and ran it. In a matter of 10 minutes they were registering 2400ppm around the pump. The thought was that when the father went down and opened the door to the room he was overcome immediately and went down. The wife saw him go down and when she went to help him she was also overcome. The health department was going to do a study in the area to see how much HS was given off when people took a shower after this call. The FD have never heard of any results of that but the FD does know that they are going to town and getting city water put in all over the place.

12/19/06 - I was the officer of the first ambulance on the scene and the first one in the building in the Orland Park hazmat incident that you have already written about. I've been reading your letters for a couple of years now and I never thought that a simple asthma EMS call could get so intense so quikly and develop into such a dangerous situation. It came down to making a split second decision and we decided to stay and perform 2 recues inside the house. Unfortunatly 1 of the residents passed away from what I believe were severe respiratory track burns from a combination of home remedies, bleach, and industrial strength drain cleaners which turned into other chlorine based gases and other acids. The good news is the other 2 residents will both make it. It depends on what B/C you talk to wether we made the right decision to stay in the house. There will always be critics of judgement calls like these but I hope that we made the right one.Just wanted to let you know all 6 of us were treated and released from 3 different area hospitals that day and are expected to be back to work next shift. Thanks again for your article, just hope I never have to read about anyone, especially myself and the people I work with ever again. LESSONS LEARNED: We are working with the department safety committee to look at the situation and see what else could have been done to make a future call like this end up with no injuries and learn from this experience. I believe The FPD is expecting a visit from the IL DOL who will probably cunduct there own investigation and deliver a set of recommendations.

Our engine company, with four, was dispatched to a gas leak, inside a residential structure. On arrival, the Captain was informed by the homeowner, of a gas leak in the kitchen, with the meter being in the basement. As I came off the engine, I heard the homeowner say, down the basement and make a right. My Captain headed into the house and I went with him. The other firefighter and the driver were getting the gas monitor in service. When we entered the house, we knew we had more than a small gas leak. The gas line to the stove was disconnected, pumping natural gas into the home. My Captain headed for the basement, I started opening up the house. I then went down the stairs, made a right turn, into a laundry room. At the same time, my Captain entered, from the opposite side and said he was having problems locating the meter. We continued looking and found the meter in a closet, the meter was visible through a small hole, cut in the drywall. We tried, with no success to shut the gas off, with the tools we had. We headed back upstairs, for more equipment, where we met our other firefighter, with the gas meter, that was in full alarm. I gave the captain a pair of channel locks and he headed back to the basement. The other firefighter informed me, that we were operating in a 10-15% LEL atmosphere. We continued opening up. I was going to kink the line and kneel on it, when the Captain got the gas shut off, after knocking a small hole in the drywall. We were able to completely open the house up, and the levels began dropping. Lessons learned: Don't rush in, take the time to ensure a complete size-up. Call for more help right away, it's better to call than not call at all. Wear you mask, it may sound routine, but it's not. Treat every run like it could be your last, one spark and this one could have been for 3 of us. An empty residence is not worth 3 firefighters lives. Stay calm, no matter what the situation, We all stayed calm and did what needed to be done. We worked as a team and thankfully we all went home.

On 8/28/06 @ 1919hrs. Engine 4 responded to a report of a van leaking oil. On arrival, Engine 4 crew found a 1977 Dodge van leaking numerous fluids, including power steering and transmission fluid. Absorbent was placed around the van to prevent the fluids from entering the storm drain. Upon further investigation, three 55 gallon drums were discovered inside the van (see below photo). Police were called to stand-by while the van was opened and the drums were checked. The drums were empty, containing only slight residue and the odor of Hydrocarbons. The van was towed and impounded. The incident served as a reminder of the hazards that may be encountered at a seemingly benign incident.

IT'S NO GAME!!!
 
My Department (with Mutual aid from several other departments) was working a barn fire. The barn was about 40 feet from a House and it had an elevated gasoline tank just a few feet from it. The temp was about 100 degrees with around 65 percent humidity so our crews were wearing out quickly. We had some water supply problems at the beginning of the call that caused our frustration level to rise a bit.

The event happened during overhaul so with the heat, and the frustration from the earlier water supply problems no one was at their best. money, Unfortunately, we were unable to save the barn and it was about 80% on the ground. We were in the process of overhaul and my partner and I were on the way back from rehab when it was suggested an officer from one of the mutual aid departments that we should probably not wear my bunker coats any more because of the heat of the day and “anyway the fire is just about out”. My partner and I chose to put ALL of our gear on before we went back in even though it was a hot day, just in case. About 5 minutes later my who had the pike pole pulled back a sheet of tin that had some small flames visible around it. We saw a wooden box with 6” flames coming from one corner of it. The man on the hose put water on the flames. Much to out surprise the box contained 25 pounds of engine parts that were made from magnesium!! We got to see, and until we scrambled back far enough we were part of a very beautiful, but not very fun, fourth of July type fireworks show.

No one was hurt. A few burn marks on our gear but no injuries. This was in part do to the fact that we were wearing our gear. And that the man on the hose line quickly pulled his hose stream off of the box, changed it to a fog pattern and used it to protect us until we could scramble back out of danger.

The lessons I learned here are that even during overhaul no matter how hot, tired and frustrated you are keep wearing all of you gear and make sure you have a charged hose line close by to cover you just in case the unexpended happens. Also do not get so focused on the obvious dangers like the exposure and the fuel tank that you do not look for the hidden dangers because it is usually the hidden dangers that will bite you. Just think if we had taken the advise of the mutual aid officer and not put our gear back on. The day would have an entirely different ending.
 

Our small FDgot a call from a factory saying that they had a chemical leak and would like the fire dept to check it out (only 2 or 3 guys on the dept. trained to the tech. level). The fire chief tells 2 green ff's to hop in the tanker and go check it out. They turn down the road toward the factory and it hits them CHLORINE GAS! They rapidlly get out of the tanker put their bunker gear on & SCBA. Radio the chief, tell him what they have. The director of a well trained regional haz mat team located 5 minutes away hears the radio traffic and offers to sent a haz mat unit to the scene. The fire chief tells him "negative". the chief calls the firefighters on a cell phone (he's not at the scene and he never responds) and tells them to take care of it. The young brothers, fearing reprimand, go and shut off a LEAKING CHLORINE CYLINDER, in regular bunker gear. The cylinder was located outside the factory. The 2 brothers were trained only to the awareness level. How I found out about this, I was going over SCBA drills in the bay (a large apparatus bay)and kept smelling something. One of the students asked to speak with me. He asked me if I thought his gear was o.k. Standing about 3 feet away from the chlorine vapors would sting your nostrils. This was 5 days after this incident happened! That's when I began piecing together what happened. The fire chief is the only full time paid fire offical in this town, everyone else is paid on call. He is now working furiosly to try to cover up the incident. The firefighters complained of some symptoms that may be relative, but at last word, the chief had the brothers talked out of any medical evaluation (one of the firefighters told me he didn't want to say anything due to fear of getting kicked off the department). What happens from here, I don't know.

Two engine companies responded to a leaking 3" gas line cut by workers. On arrival engine companies began evacuation of homes in close proximity of the leak. Gas company workers began digging a hole 100 feet up wind of the leak. They planned to hot tape the pipe to install a valve to abate the leak. Without coordination, the gas company began welding with tape on to the steel pipe only one crew member was close enough to see the operation all other members were still evacuating the area. During this hazardous operation only one firefighter was standing by with full PPE. Gas Co. employees explained that if while welding they blew through the pipe a large explosion would occur. Command and the fire dept were not informed of the hazards, had not coordinated with the gas company which put members of the gas company and the fire dept at risk. Fortunately the hot tape operation went well but if the pipe had failed this could have cost the lives of approximately 8 people both from the fire dept and the gas company. The gas company supervisors and the incident commander are changing SOPs for both organizations. Additional training is planned

6/1/05 HazMat call--- Responded with bunker gear and SCBA for "pool chemicals that got wet and was giving off gas". We dumped and diluted the solution resulting from a 6 gallon bucket of Chlorine granules being left open in the rain. After everything was washed down with 600 gallons of water the bucket was found to have a 2-3" layer crystallized in the bottom. 'Someone' screwed the lid back on the wet bucket. When I noticed I objected that it could explode, and recommended we open the bucket and fill it with kitty litter to absorb the water and just sit the lid on the top without screwing it down. The Chief called a chemical hotline and asked if Chlorine would explode. They said no, it wouldn't burn or explode. The Chief was going to leave the closed bucket with the property owner for disposal. My chemistry probably isn't precise, but roughly, Chlorine mixed with water steals the hydrogen and makes HCl and leaves O2 as a fee gas. The reaction produces heat which expands the gas. The property owner approached me and said what I was saying made sense. He was going to follow my suggestions. I couldn't just drive off and leave him or his kids to discover whether or not it was dangerous. I walked over to remove the lid myself. It exploded as soon as I touched it turning the plastic of the bucket into shrapnel. The worst injury was from a shard penetrating at the top of my lip and going through my cheekbone to puncture my right sinus. I was lucky that I'd taken my helmet off. It may have taken my head off.

Hazardous materials training for firefighters responding to freight railroad incidents has been around for many years. Unfortunately, dealing with the most basic issues of how to contact the railroad, how to stop a train, how to shut down a locomotive, communicating effectively with the railroads, and just reading a wheel report (train documents), have often been issues that responding crews have had to muddle their way through, often by trial and error. Little in the way of comprehensive training and education has been readily available in this area. “Rail Safety for Emergency Responders” is a new course now available through Operation Lifesaver (OL) that addresses these issues. Operation Lifesaver is a national, non-profit public safety education and outreach program designed to eliminate collisions, deaths and injuries at rail crossings and rights-of-way. OL has State Coordinators in every state except Hawaii and has over 3,000 Presenters in the United States trained to educate the public and special groups about rail safety. OL programs are also expanding in Canada, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and Estonia. Responders Safety First Your safety first, is the theme of the program and is the title of the introductory video that urges responders to first review their own procedures for crossing railroad tracks or operating around trains. Developed through a cooperative effort of the major US and Canadian railroads, firefighters and EMS personnel, law enforcement agencies, hazardous materials trainers, along with input from Amtrak and Operation Lifesaver, this new Emergency Responder course is designed to fit into four hours of classroom instruction. Optional hands-on equipment familiarization at a nearby rail yard or siding is offered when possible to provide participants first-hand knowledge and awareness of specific railroad locomotive and freight car operations, functions, safety shut-offs, hazard locations, as well as on-scene right-of-way operational dangers and precautions. “Rail Safety for Emergency Responders” provides response personnel education and training:  to prepare for potential train incidents even if their community has never had a rail incident  about the dangers of working on or around railroad property  about railroad-related factors that affect emergency response  to identify the types of railroad equipment and how to avoid danger  about the differences in terms used by the railroads to avoid miscommunications (Rail dispatchers learn responder terms to understand their calls.)  about Rail Corridor Emergency Response plans and how to develop them Through good firefighter education and training we can reduce the number of incidents and close calls involving trains. For more information about “Rail Safety for Emergency Responders” contact Operation Lifesaver at 1-800-537-6224 or by email at general@oli.org. For more information about OL and the Emergency Responder course visit Operation Lifesaver’s web site at www.oli.org.

Chief, I saw the following on your website in the HazMat Close Call Section:: WITHOUT WARNING-AN AMTRAK TRAIN WHIZZED BY.... ...WHILE WE WERE FOCUSING ON THE EMERGENCY... ...Not That Train!! In addition to dealing with the Hazmat situation at hand and establishing a Safety Sector, I just have a few quick comments on dealing with railroads during emergencies. When dealing with any incident on or near railroad tracks Fire Departments must (for the safety of their personnel): 1. Assume all tracks are active and expect train movement on any track, at any time, in any direction. Never rely on your local train schedule. 2. Notify the railroad and give the dispatcher the following information: a. The nature of the incident b. The exact location (Milepost/Mile Marker information, Catenary Pole numbers, Signal numbers, Grade Crossing Signs, Overhead Bridges, Underpasses, and Land marks) c. The name of the Incident Commander NOTE- Train Dispatchers can be responsible for hundreds of miles of Right-of-Way in several states. Exact location information will allow them to quickly notify any train crews in the area of your presence. 2. Prior to operating on or within 15' of the tracks notify and request the following from the host railroad (the railroad that owns/operates the tracks), all train movement stopped on the affected track(s), if the trains are powered by AC catenary or DC 3rd rail power, request that power be removed on the affected track(s). 3. WAIT FOR CONFIRMATION THAT EVERYTHING IN #2 HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH PRIOR TO OPERATING ON OR WITHIN 15' OF THE TRACKS. In some areas, it may take a little while to receive this confirmation. 4. NEVER PUT APPARATUS WITHIN 15' OF THE TRACKS UNLESS YOU HAVE CONFIRMATION THAT EVERYTHING IN #2 IS COMPLIED WITH. 5. Prior to the arrival of railroad personnel, establish flagging protection prior to committing any personnel or equipment on the tracks. This is done by stationing fire department personnel, ( in teams of 2) in turnout gear, 2 miles in each direction of the incident, with radios, handlights and flares (use caution if the incident involves hazardous materials) and do the following: a. Stand at least 15 feet away from the nearest track b. Wave a lighted flare (if it is safe to do so), or a handlight, horizontally from side to side, in front of them at hip level at an approaching train. This will signal the engineer to stop the train (Keep in mind it may take a train a great distance to stop). c. NEVER USE FIRE APPARATUS OR ANY OTHER EMERGENCY VEHICLE TO PROTECT EMERGENCY SCENE OPERATIONS BY BLOCKING TRACKS. Just like you preplan buildings in your response area, every fire department should have a preplan and know how to handle railroad emergency that occur within their response area (whether they are passenger or freight railroads). They need to have a good working relationship with the railroads and maintain updated emergency contact numbers, they need to train with the railroads and be familiar with the railroad Right-of Way in their response area. Railroads offer training courses to emergency response agencies that cover their Right of Way. Training is available from Amtrak for emergency response agencies that may respond to incidents involving Amtrak equipment, facilities or Right of Way. This training is customized for the individual jurisdiction of the requesting agency. Agencies requesting this training from Amtrak can contact the Office of Emergency Preparedness 202-906-3889 or E-mail Amtrak Fire Safety at hearng@amtrak.com. Stay Safe Gary P. Hearn Amtrak Fire Safety

WITHOUT WARNING-AN AMTRAK TRAIN WHIZZED BY.... ...WHILE WE WERE FOCUSING ON THE EMERGENCY... ...Not That Train!! FFCC.COM NOTES: As we read this, we are further convinced that ANY scene we operate on should have a SAFETY SECTOR established...if only to be those additional set of eyes who focus on THE BIG PICTURE and what MIGHT go wrong. What we do requires "tasks" and tasks require FIREFIGHTERS...when the FF's are busy-WHO is looking out for them? We ALL should be-but SAFETY can help make a BIG difference for the times we may not. We responded to a leaking railrod car of anhydrous ammonia. As Capt, I wanted to make sure we did everything right.The RR car was on the second track, we masked up, approached from upwind side and thought everything was going right. My Firefighter and I were 2 steps away from crossing the tracks when an AMTRAK train whizzed by us from the opposite direction. With the airpacs on and focusing on the Railroad Car, I lost sight of paying attention to any other trains. Lesson: Request a full response on any and all haz mats. If nothing else, another set of eyes!

From correspondents in Hong Kong July 7, 2004 A FIREMAN and a workman died in Hong Kong in what is believed to have been a deadly gas leak from a car parking lot drain, police said. The two were declared dead in hospital after they and another five firemen were overcome by fumes released from a manhole. Firefighters were called to the scene in the eastern Shau Kei Wan district after one of the workmen fell into the manhole during drainage work in the car park basement. TV news images showed frantic scenes as ambulancemen tried to revive downed firemen. A police spokeswoman said investigators were still looking into what the gas was and how it was leaked into the air. Post-mortem examinations into what killed the two men were also ongoing, the spokeswoman said.